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ABSTRACT
“To taste her mystic Bread” or “the mocking echo of his own”: 
Uses of Nature in the Poems of Emily Dickinson and Robert Frost
by
Ian Weaver, Master of Science
Utah State University, 2012
Major Professor: Dr. Paul Crumbley
Department: English
 This thesis highlights the fact that the way Emily Dickinson and Robert Frost 
understood nature informed their work as writers. The underlying theme through each 
chapter is how epistemology about the natural world is created. It compares two seem-
ingly opposed approaches to knowledge construction about nature, answering the ques-
tion: Is knowledge and value about nature socially constructed or inherently existent and 
discovered. The second chapter emphasizes that Dickinson considered knowledge based 
in nature to be socially constructed, making the subjugation of the nineteenth-century 
woman one of her central subjects. The third chapter shows how Frost agreed with social 
constructivism in that knowledge is the product of imaginative involvement; he used a 
constructive stance to emphasize humanity’s important role in compelling nature to reveal 
spiritual truths, which made the reciprocal relationship between people and their environ-
ments central to his work. The concluding chapter synthesizes these two approaches and 
suggests that both are necessary in our modern day understanding of nature.
(79 pages)
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PUBLIC ABSTRACT
“To taste her mystic Bread” or “the mocking echo of his own”: Uses of Nature in the 
Poems of Emily Dickinson and Robert Frost
Ian Weaver
  The central question to this thesis is: how is knowledge about nature created? A 
comprehensive study to adequately answer this question would be impossible; therefore, 
this thesis focuses on two prominent American poets’ approaches to nature: Emily Dick-
inson and Robert Frost. These poets’ nature poems are comparable for several reasons 
with a few being that both lived the majority of their lives in New England; both have had 
a significant impact on American nature writing; and both use nature as central to their 
work. But most importantly, Dickinson’s and Frost’s poetry are comparable because they 
have seemingly opposed approaches to nature.
 After the introduction, chapter two focuses on Dickinson. One of her primary 
uses of nature in her poetry focuses on nineteenth-century women. Women in the nine-
teenth century lived under strict expectations from society, religion, and family. Nature 
metaphors were frequently compared to women in order to keep them within society’s 
assigned roles. Such a comparison often led women to internalize societal beliefs, which 
led to women assuming such expectations were natural. As such, my analysis of Dickin-
son’s use of nature focuses on her censorship of nineteenth-century society. She questions 
whether meaning and knowledge about nature is found or a figment of the imagination. 
She favors the idea that knowledge about nature (especially when applied to women) is 
socially constructed.
 Frost, on the other hand, prefers to investigate nature with the hope of finding 
value in nature that inherently exists. The third chapter points to Frost’s focus on the 
important role the individual plays in both discovering and making meaning about nature 
rather than all meaning being socially constructed. A constant thread through much of 
his poetry is the fear that nature holds no inherent meaning, disproving the existence of a 
higher being. His poetry, however, reasons out a way to counteract the social constructiv-
ism of Darwinian theory that so pervasively influenced his time. Many of Frost’s themes 
and use of nature stress the importance of the human imagination, making his approach to 
nature seemingly opposed to Dickinson’s.
 The word “seemingly” introduces the central point of the fourth and last chapter. 
Though Dickinson prefers social constructivism and Frost favors the imagination, both 
poets’ use of nature equally favor how knowledge is created rather than what knowl-
edge is created. The last chapter points out that a critical approach is needed when mak-
ing meaning about the natural world. Assuming that all meaning is socially constructed 
devalues knowledge about the natural world; assuming that all meaning must be initiated 
and maintained by the imagination, however, risks the credibility of knowledge created. 
Thus, not only does a comparison of these two poets’ nature poetry enhance our appre-
ciation for such unique approaches, it also gives us a way to look at how meaning and 
knowledge is created about the natural world in our modern society. A simple application 
of this approach could benefit society in recognizing that there resides a romantic hope as 
a subtext in consumer marketing that nature contains some sort of inherent, self-evident 
meaning (the belief in a plutonic reality).
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INTRODUCTION 
 Nature plays a central role in the poetry of Emily Dickinson and Robert Frost, 
yet their uses of nature differ unmistakably. While Dickinson treats nature as perpetually 
subject to cultural appropriation for the purpose of establishing social codes, Frost looks 
to nature as a resource vital to poetic creation. Different as these two approaches are, 
they derive from a shared conviction that accepting nature as indefinable is central to 
the full expression of the self that they explore in their poetry. That these two American 
poets should share an interest in nature is not in itself surprising; what is of interest, 
however, is the understanding of each poet’s relationship to their culture that becomes 
more pronounced as their approaches to nature are made clear. When considered in light 
of her use of nature, the notoriously reclusive Dickinson emerges as a poet who is more 
deeply invested in the public implications of nature than is Frost, despite his stature as 
one of the most public of all American poets. A benefit of reading these poets in terms of 
their examinations of nature is that doing so supports the view that Dickinson was more 
deeply engaged in the public life of her culture than is commonly thought to be the case 
and that Frost was actually the more reclusive of the two when it comes to his poetic uses 
of nature. 
 Central to Frost’s and Dickinson’s distinct encounters with nature is the way 
each responds to the unavoidable fact that nature is constantly misread and distorted. 
Inaccuracies are of course inevitable due to the fact that even science, the most stable and 
reliable source of knowledge, ceaselessly presents new facts that alter our understanding 
of the world around us. In Dickinson’s case, this expanding awareness is a source of 
wonder that ought to be part of the way humans structure social relations. The problem, 
as she sees it, is that societies do just the opposite: they ground social conduct on 
fixed beliefs about nature that result in social codes that require behavior she views as 
fundamentally unnatural. A clear example of this is a passage that appears in a letter she 
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wrote to her friend and literary advisor Thomas Wentworth Higginson in 1862. In an 
unusually coherent and limpid paragraph, she explains how she discovered the inaccuracy 
of conventional social views of nature when she was a little girl. She points out that as 
a child she was “much in the Woods,” provoking a warning from those who considered 
it improper for her to be on her own in wild nature. “I was told,” she recalls, “that the 
Snake would bite me, that I might pick a poisonous flower, or Goblins kidnap me, but 
I went along and met no one but Angels, who were far shyer of me, than I could be of 
them, so I hav’nt that confidence in fraud which many exercise” (Letters 415). Through 
this episode, we see Dickinson telling Higginson that she has come to question the role 
of nature as a foundation for restrictions imposed on the activities of a young girl. This 
episode seems particularly representative of her ongoing fascination with the cultural 
codification of nature as the basis for highly restrictive social codes governing women’s 
roles in nineteenth-century American culture.
 The first line in my title—“To taste her mystic Bread”—comes from Dickinson’s 
poem “These are the Signs to Nature’s Inns –” (Fr 1106), a poem in which Dickinson 
expresses her conviction that nature constantly eludes humanity’s insistent efforts to 
understand it. In Dickinson’s eyes, the wonderful part of nature is that it constantly yields 
new information and therefore resists any efforts to stabilize its meanings. As the word 
“mystic” suggests, nature keeps its secrets hidden. Thus in the line “To taste her mystic 
Bread,” Dickinson implies that using nature’s bread to enforce social regulations ignores 
the fact that some knowledge exists beyond human intellect. When read in context with 
the first stanza, Dickinson’s sentiment is explained further:
These are the Signs to Nature’s Inns –
Her invitation broad
To Whosoever Famishing
To taste her mystic Bread – (1-3) 
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Despite nature’s elusive qualities, this stanza implies that those who are famished can 
find rest in nature’s lodgings. Rest, however, is not the assurance or peace that comes 
from being certain. Because nature’s bread is mystic, Dickinson asserts that the famished 
find rest by accepting nature’s uncertainties. To explain further, partaking of nature’s 
bread revitalizes the famished not because it clarifies but rather mystifies the viewer 
with multiple interpretations of nature. Tasting nature’s bread frees the individual from 
restrictive definitions of nature and, as a consequence, enables the individual to escape 
confinement by creating meaning—and thereby determine what is natural—for him or 
herself. Nature’s rest leaves the individual with a feeling of anxiety that accompanies the 
new and expanded sense of freedom as it releases the famished from the social pressure 
to conform. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, that rest is obtainable is not 
privileged knowledge restricted to a particular person, class, or sex. The famished can 
find a form of respite in nature’s lodgings, or “Inns,” by the fact that nature’s “invitation” 
is “broad” (2) or perhaps all-encompassing and liberal. As Dickinson writes in the second 
stanza, nature’s doors are open “with an equal width / To Beggar and to Bee” (7-8), 
placing nature in a position that makes it available for examination by anyone. 
It is important to emphasize that Dickinson’s respite or rest for the famished does 
not come in the form of complacency. Complacency would be the passive acceptance 
of what culture defines as “natural,” placing individuals in a position to forget their own 
constructive power. Rest as complacency assumes that how one understands nature is 
natural rather than constructed. As Dickinson states in this poem, an understanding of 
nature does not leave room for one to be confident in knowledge about nature, but rather 
that by partaking of the “mystic Bread” one can feel confident in their own ability to 
make meaning, which must be based on personal assessment at an individual level, not 
the justification for social codes. 
 Frost’s use of nature is even more intimate and personal. He too is concerned 
with how culture defines nature, but his concern lies imbedded in the fear that no grand 
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design for the universe exists—particularly because epistemology about nature in Frost’s 
day was so fundamentally founded on Darwin’s explanation of the natural world (Hass 
2 and 3). Many of Frost’s poems suggest that he suffered from the dualistic paradigm 
he developed early in life from his parents: the coexistence and therefore contradiction 
of being both a believer and a doubter. From his mother, he learned to believe in the 
supernatural, that a grand design existed (Parini 14-15). From his father he learned how 
to be skeptical and doubtful of anything but provable fact (19). While Frost wanted to 
believe that nature contained some sort of intrinsic truth about the universe that gave 
explanation and purpose to life, his doubt left him unsure about what could finally be 
proven, making Frost a perpetually doubting believer. The intimacy in Frost’s nature 
poetry shows itself in his internal conflict—his dualistic angst—towards the natural 
world: is there a grand design, or are we the result of mechanical evolution? Frost’s desire 
for a grand design shows itself in his search for revelation from an external nature, and 
the possibility that we are the result of mechanical evolution shows itself in his assertion 
that all meaning found in nature is constructed by the imagination. 
The second line in my title, “the mocking echo of his own,” represents Frost’s 
fear that an intrinsic part of nature does not exist, leaving all thought and knowledge 
about life and the natural world constructed rather than the product of an external 
reality. This line comes from his poem titled “The Most of It,” a poem in which Frost 
expresses his dualistic angst towards the natural world. The first half of the poem (lines 
1-9) demonstrates Frost’s fear that there is no grand design. His speaker narrates that 
when in search of meaning, life does not want “its own love back in copy speech, / But 
counter-love, original response” (7-8). Surely some form of counter-love or “genuine 
exchange…in which one receives…not [his] own gift back again…” would assure that 
cold, mechanical evolution was not life’s origin (Klein 366). As the poem continues, 
however—and as the phrase “mocking echo” suggests—nature’s retort not only mimics 
but taunts the character’s attempt in seeking original response. As a result, the character 
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concludes that he “kept the universe alone,” implying that nature has no intrinsic meaning 
to reveal; all knowledge created is a construction of the individual’s imagination. 
Displaying both sides of his dualistic approach to nature, however, Frost ends the 
second half of “The Most” (lines 10-20) suggesting the opposite. His alternate approach 
is shown in the following lines: “nothing ever came of what he cried / Unless it was the 
embodiment that crashed / In the cliff’s talus on the other side…” (9-11). The pivotal 
word “Unless” shows Frost’s hope that nature can reveal some sort of intrinsic truth to an 
individual, turning the direction of the poem away from “mocking echoe[s]” and towards 
“original response.” The remainder of the poem exhibits original response: the form of a 
“great buck” crashing into the water and swimming across a lake (16-20). As “The Most” 
displays, Frost builds a bridge between original response and mocking echoes, hoping to 
find meaning somewhere between the two. The bridge endeavors to merge Frost’s doubt 
and belief, leaving room for both to exist.
The phrase “mocking echo” clearly repeats itself in many of his poems and is key 
to understanding his approach to nature. For example, the lines “All revelation has been 
ours” from his poem “All Revelation” and “never seeing / Deeper down in the well than 
where the water / Gives me back in a shining surface picture / Me myself…” (lines) in 
his poem “For Once, Then, Something” give the impression that Frost constantly dealt 
with the fear that he was alone in the universe. Always accompanying his fear, however, 
is a counter layer of meaning that proposes the hope for a form of intrinsic truth. In 
my analysis of his poetry, I call Frost’s combination of “mocking echo” and “original 
response” his reciprocal, revelational relationship to nature. The relationship is reciprocal 
because both the person and nature give to the moment. Though nature may provide 
original response, an individual must use his imagination to make meaning from nature’s 
revelation; both nature and the individual exchange forms of response, which enables 
the individual to find meaning in the encounter. The word “revelation” works for Frost’s 
relationship to nature because he often builds his poems around moments of epiphany 
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where nature speaks out of mystery, revealing itself briefly without shedding its final and 
ultimate impenetrability.   
 Despite the differences between Frost and Dickinson, each poet seeks to 
defamiliarize nature in order to give constructive and defining power to the individual. 
Accompanying such a belief comes the disclaimer: if knowledge can be constructed—
however based it is in the natural world—then that knowledge is somewhat precarious. 
As I see it, Dickinson’s approach to nature critiques culturally imposed definitions in a 
social context while Frost approaches nature to work out his internal conflict between 
doubt and belief.
In order to show how Dickinson’s critique of nature lies in a social context, 
my opening chapter centers on how she questions her contemporaries’ understanding 
of nature. Through a close reading of her poetry, I will show how Dickinson suggests 
that social codes imposed on women during her lifetime were unjustified, and must 
be questioned, in order to resist the internal impulse to conform—which results from 
believing particular behaviors natural—would threaten agency. To immediately set up 
Dickinson’s resistance to her contemporaries’ view, I will move directly into a reading 
of her poem “‘Nature’ is what We see –” (Fr 721). This poem epitomizes Dickinson’s 
critique of nature. As she sees society placing nature in a position of authority to 
influence how women live, this poem deconstructs the power of nature as a reliable 
source for such influence. While I analyze “‘Nature’ is what We see –,” I will also show 
how Dickinson’s critique of nature has historical significance. To show this, I will give 
a close reading of the poem “Garden Lecture” that was published in The Lady’s Book of 
Flowers and Poetry in 1842 (Evans). The speaker of this poem places nature in a position 
of authority to govern social behavior. “‘Nature’ is what We see –” and “Garden Lecture” 
respond to each other nicely, demonstrating what I see as Dickinson’s quibble with 
nineteenth-century logic. By understanding how Dickinson views nature in this light, we 
are able to move forward with how she critiques the logic of placing nature in such an 
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influential position. 
To establish her critique of her contemporaries’ logic, I use Neil Smith’s analysis 
of nature from his book Uneven Development, specifically his chapter titled “The 
Ideology of Nature.” He writes, “The human-nature argument dissolves into nothing if 
for any reason at all the externality of nature is denied” (29). Human nature, he argues, is 
often fallaciously based on one of two contradicting points of view: nature either includes 
or excludes the human. In order to establish social codes based in nature—which codes 
are framed as “human nature”—one must pull from a pristine nature—not affected by 
humanity’s tainted perspective. But as I see Dickinson arguing, no such nature exists—
or if it does exist, it cannot be known. Her poem “The Outer – from the Inner” (Fr 450) 
demonstrates her opinion that the external world can never fully be understood because 
“The Inner –” always “paints the Outer –” (9). The part that whatever the inner is can 
never be expressed directly; therefore, whatever sense we make of nature is based on a 
representation and not the thing itself. As such, Dickinson argues that conceptualizing 
nature as separate from humanity is fruitless. No meaning found in nature is inherent; 
rather, meaning reflects culture. 
Once Dickinson’s critique of logic based on artificial definitions of nature is set 
up, I will move into the consequence she identifies when one does not question nature’s 
authoritative influence. This consequence is best described with Michel Foucault’s theory 
of the panopticon. Socially imposed definitions of nature act as an internal discipline 
for women in the nineteenth century. I use Daneen Wardrop’s argument from her book 
Emily Dickinson’s Gothic: Goblin with a Gauge to show how Dickinson’s technique 
allows her to question the “reproval of women that patriarchal society causes them to 
internalize” (112). A combination of Wardrop’s reading of Dickinson and my reading of 
“One need not be a Chamber – to be Haunted –” (Fr 407) shows how she recognizes 
this panoptical influence. 
At this point in the chapter, I ground Dickinson’s poetry and critique of nature 
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in her historical context. I use Barbara Welter’s essay “The Cult of True Womanhood: 
1820-1860,” Judith Farr’s book The Gardens of Emily Dickinson, my analysis of Grace 
Greenwood’s letter “To An Unrecognized Poetess,” and the poem “Garden Lecture” 
to show that social codes imposed on women in the nineteenth century were founded 
in a belief of human nature based on assumptions projected on external nature. After 
this point, I use Foucault’s concept of the panopticon to explain how Dickinson’s poem 
“Nature and God – I neither knew” (Fr 803) demonstrates that women’s agency in the 
nineteenth century, under the gaze of the cultural panopticon, was threatened. It is this 
final poem that allows me to conclude that Dickinson recognizes nature’s intrinsic value, 
yet at the same time questions the use of nature to impose social codes, especially when 
threatening agency. 
My second chapter will center on how Frost uses nature to navigate his dualistic 
paradigm. By illuminating Frost’s complex approach to nature, I will show how his doubt 
and belief merge into a reciprocal revelational relationship with nature. This relationship 
is necessary for his belief and doubt to coexist. I begin with a close reading of “Gathering 
Leaves” as this poem demonstrates Frost’s relationship to nature, introducing his 
assumption that revelation is possible and worthwhile. I will then introduce two 
themes that are key to understanding the complexity of Frost’s reciprocal, revelational 
relationship. First is the theme of “play,” taken from Karl Keller’s book The Only 
Kangaroo among the Beauty, specifically his chapter titled “When the Soul Is at Play.” 
Keller’s chapter shows how Dickinson influenced Frost’s reading of nature, particularly 
how Frost adopted Dickinson’s willingness to “dwell in possibility” (Fr 466). Frost’s use 
of play is key because it illustrates his part in the creation of knowledge about nature. 
The next theme I use to look at Frost’s approach takes Dickinson’s concept of 
“dwelling in possibility” a step further—in his version of dwelling in possibility, Frost 
sought to “lose” himself in the unknown of nature. To develop this theme, I refer to 
George Bagby’s book Frost and the Book of Nature. Bagby writes that Frost’s desire to 
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become lost was an effort to “relinquish willful control of [the revelational] progress” 
(29). His effort to lose willful control shows his hope in nature’s ability to reveal some 
sort of intrinsic truth. To establish these two themes in Frost’s words, I will give a short 
close reading of “Directive.” Afterwards, I will give a close reading of “For Once, Then, 
Something,” as this poem builds on the previous themes and adds a new one itself: that of 
imaginative expectation. Imaginative expectation precludes revelation and is a distortion 
of effective “play.” In the three main poems I analyze, imaginative expectation leads to 
the speaker’s failed efforts to receive revelation. Frost displays this theme in what I call 
his parabolic style (evident in “For Once”). This style allows him to accomplish three 
objectives. First, it allows him to demonstrate his struggle between belief and doubt. 
Second, while demonstrating this struggle, this style enables him to implicitly favor belief 
over doubt: a surface reading of his poems demonstrate his speaker’s failed attempt at 
“original response,” which is always followed by an undertow meaning that demonstrates 
successful revelation. Third, this style allows him to show what prevents successful 
revelation: imaginative expectation. To expand his theme of imaginative expectation, I 
use Amelia Klein’s essay “The Counter-love of Robert Frost.” She helps me discuss the 
implicit warning against imaginative expectation when reading the natural world, which I 
confirm in my close reading of “The Most of It.”
My analysis of these poems builds to my final and climactic reading of “All 
Revelation.” This poem embodies each theme and is the epitome of Frost’s reciprocal 
revelational relationship to nature. In this poem, he demonstrates his imagination in the 
form of play and chooses to become lost (or disoriented) in order to avoid (or remain 
free from) fixed imaginative expectation. Ultimately, this poem shows how Frost makes 
room for his dualistic angst, allowing him to find satisfaction in knowledge created 
about nature. To do so, Frost presents the possibility that revelation is obtainable through 
reciprocity between human and nature wedded in a metaphorically consummated 
relationship. My reading of “All Revelation” permits me to conclude that Frost obviously 
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sought a relationship with nature in which he sees himself—a personal self—as 
absolutely necessary in creating and receiving knowledge about the natural world.
My third and concluding chapter will be an effort to explain what the implications 
of my reading of Frost and Dickinson have on their respective scholarship. A reading 
of how these poets use nature reverses public perception of Dickinson and Frost. The 
popular image of Dickinson as an agoraphobic only interested in personal expression 
is questioned by her social critique of nature (Garbowsky). In addition, Frost’s use of 
nature challenges his commonly accepted persona of the peoples’ poet. His deep-rooted, 
dualistic angst causes him to approach nature for personal reasons. 
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FROM PRISTINE TO HUMAN NATURE: EMILY DICKINSON’S 
QUESTIONING OF AUTHORITY
Strange as it may seem to twenty-first century readers, Emily Dickinson lived 
during a time when women were admonished to “Live up to the full measure of life; give 
way to [their] impulses, loves, and enthusiasms” (Greenwood 311). Though this seems 
an encouraging sentiment, women were also reminded that they should “Never unsex 
[themselves’] for greatness” (311). They were taught, “The intellectual woman should 
be richest in ‘social and domestic ties’…. [And that] true feminine genius is ever timid, 
doubtful, and clingingly dependent” (310). To understand the apparent contradiction 
between these two ideas—“give way to your impulses…” and “true feminine genius is 
ever timid…”—we must assume that the internal spark and impulse of a woman was to 
shrink “instinctively from greatness” (310) and remain “feminine in her dependence” on 
social and domestic ties (312). According to pervading cultural values, the nineteenth-
century woman was, by nature, a housewife and a nurturer; “the best refuge for such a 
delicate creature was the warmth and safety of her home” (Welter 54). But Dickinson saw 
this differently. 
A closer look at her use of the word “nature” in her poems supports Neil Smith’s 
assertion from his book Uneven Development: Nature, Capital, and the Production of 
Space that “the human-nature argument dissolves into nothing if for any reason at all the 
externality of nature is denied” (29). By questioning her contemporaries’ understanding 
of nature, Emily Dickinson suggests that social codes imposed on women during her 
lifetime were unjustified; and, if not questioned, then the influence inherent in believing 
particular behaviors natural—the internal impulses to conform—would threaten agency. 
To oppose such influence, Dickinson used gothic and spiritualist language to promote 
democratic thought.1 It is ultimately democratic thought that can prevent unconscious 
1. In his book Winds of Will: Emily Dickinson and the Sovereignty of Democratic 
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conformity. To see her need for democratic language, we need to understand how 
Dickinson critiques nature, for the fundamental premise upon which she founds her 
critique of social codes is how society uses nature as the foundation for authority. 
Smith’s words describe the problem Dickinson addresses in her nature poetry. 
He writes that “Nature is generally seen as precisely that which cannot be produced; it is 
the antithesis to human activity” (49). Because nature seems disconnected from human 
construction, it “presents itself to us as the material substratum of daily life, [becoming] 
a realm of use values….” In her poem “‘Nature’ is what We see –” (Fr 721), Dickinson 
identifies the epistemological progression that explains how people imbue nature with 
value (which what results is nature becomes culturally and personally authoritative:
“Nature” is what We see – 
The Hill – the Afternoon – 
Squirrel – Eclipse – the Bumble bee – 
Nay – Nature is Heaven – 
 
“Nature” is what We hear – 
The Bobolink – the Sea –
Thunder – the Cricket – 
Nay – Nature is Harmony – 
 
“Nature” is what We know –
But have no Art to say – 
So impotent our Wisdom is
To Her Sincerity –
The first lines of each stanza read, “‘Nature’ is what We see –,” “‘Nature is what We hear 
–,” and “‘Nature’ is what We know –.” The speaker moves from sensory experiences—
seeing and hearing—to the abstract—knowledge. This progression shows that the speaker 
creates knowledge based on what he or she has experienced—what we see is what we 
know: a form of empirical observation. But considering the point that the word “Nature” 
Thought, Paul Crumbley develops the idea that spiritualist language allows for 
democratic thought; the use of gothic language to create ambiguity originates 
from Daneen Wardrop in her book Emily Dickinson’s Gothic: Goblin with a 
Gauge. 
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is capitalized suggests that nature may have more authoritative weight than just simple 
knowledge based in observation. Supporting this idea, the last line from the first and 
second stanzas read, “Nay – Nature is Heaven –” and “Nay – Nature is Harmony –.” In 
both instances, the word “Nay” follows a list of what the speaker suggests we see and 
then hear. “Nay,” then, works as another level of renaming or defining. Nature is not only 
what we see and hear, but it is also heaven—or God, the creator of all things natural—
and harmony—order, congruity, wholeness (“Harmony”). This movement from sensory 
experience to knowledge by observing an authoritative nature also suggests that nature 
is a reliable source of truth, especially as it is connected to heaven and harmony. Nature 
becomes a source by which knowledge is created. This knowledge is aligned with God 
and is harmonious, having no contradictions. Nature, as the speaker sets forth, holds an 
authoritative and influential position.
To assume that nature has such autonomous power—a nature that consciously 
and actively emits its influence on the human mind—would be preposterous. Dickinson’s 
critique of her contemporaries’ appropriation of nature speaks directly to the autonomy 
given to nature in her time. Though she would have been only twelve when it was 
published, the poem “Garden Lecture” (1842) demonstrates what type of thinking 
Dickinson critiques in “‘Nature’ is what We see –.” “Garden Lecture” was published 
in the famous houseplant and garden instruction book for women in 1842, titled The 
Lady’s Book of Flowers and Poetry. This popular household book is representative of 
how language in the nineteenth century conflated women with religion and nature. This 
poem specifically shows the tendency to search for meaning in nature and establish Truth 
on empirical evidence. In fact, Dickinson’s poem could almost be a direct response to 
“Garden Lecture.”
The language of “Garden Lecture” is important to Dickinson’s critique of nature 
because it embodies the nineteenth-century belief that nature could “enforce” social 
codes, identifying the source by which human nature can be labeled “natural” (6). As we 
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can see, the title itself prepares the speaker—and by extension the reader—to become 
nature’s student and partake of her educating wisdom. The first stanza reads: 
Amid my garden’s broider’d paths I trod,
    And there my mind soon caught her favourite clue;
I seem’d to stand amid the church of God,
    And flowers were preachers, and (still stranger) drew
        From their own life and course
        The love they would enforce
And sound their doctrine was, and every precept true. (1-7)
Straight away the language offers itself to criticism from Dickinson’s “‘Nature’ is what 
We see –” as the speaker positions nature in an authoritative role, implying that nature 
is some sort of revelatory conduit—a prophet of sorts—for God’s teachings: he pictures 
himself “amid the church of God,” the garden’s preachers (flowers) enforcing a doctrine 
with “every precept true” (3-7). Comparing the colorful and fragrant garden to an 
ornamented church, the speaker’s walk down his “broider’d” garden paths leads him to 
conclude, in effect, “Nay –” nature is not just a simple arrangement of flowers, “Nature 
is Heaven –” (and because he finds the flowers’ doctrine “sound,” he could also conclude 
that “Nature is Harmony –,” its dogma pleasing to the ear, full and complete, with no 
contradictions in the favored views of his culture). The speaker walks past various 
flowers in the next six stanzas, each flower teaching their  “doctrine” and demonstrating 
through its own “course and life” a proper protocol: the speaker walks past the sunflower 
that turns its head with the sun—“From womb to grave pursue the Sun of life and Might” 
(8-14); he walks past a “Camomile” who emits a sweet fragrance despite being trampled 
on by “reckless feet,” teaching—“as insulters press, / E’en turn thou thus and bless” 
(15-21); he walks past a “Stonecrop” (the generic name for the sedum plant which has 
shallow growing roots) who relies on the “juicy nurture from the sky” rather than the 
soil to “Draw life’s unearthly food” (emphasis added 22-28); etc. It is simple to see 
that a didactic poem such as “Garden Lecture” could have prompted Dickinson to write 
“‘Nature’ is what We see –.” The blatant conflation of religion and nature places nature 
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in an authoritative position, especially when considering this was written in nineteenth-
century New England. Such linking with religion gives the flowers authority to preach 
what is “natural”: the flowers display their message through the way they live their lives. 
 Because “Garden Lecture’s” rhetoric is so obvious, however, the speaker’s 
placement of nature in an authoritative position comes across as a fiction of the mind; 
it seems that the speaker sees and hears what he wants rather than what actually exists. 
The speaker’s word “seem’d” in the third line admits that the flowers’ doctrine was of his 
own construction. Essentially, nature gave the impression that its inhabitants represent a 
higher power. Even the fact that the poem is titled “Garden Lecture” speaks to the theme 
of construction. By water, sun, and the inner workings of photosynthesis, the flowers 
would grow naturally, but a garden by nature is constructed. It is tilled, weeded, and 
pruned by a gardener. The gardener is the creator—he chooses which flowers to plant; he 
decides what are weeds and what are not. It may make sense, then, that the mind would 
follow. Certainly, any whisperings or secrets from flowers come from the mind of the 
speaker rather than the flowers themselves, and those whisperings come as tailored as 
a groomed garden.
The point that nature’s authoritative power is a construction of the speaker’s 
mind introduces an interesting contradiction: despite the fact that nature’s virtues are a 
construction of his imagination, nature still authoritatively influences how he decides 
to live.  After six different flowers lecture, the “host”—or the garden’s occupants as a 
whole—call the speaker to action: 
Then cried the garden’s host with one consent:
    Come, man, and see how, day by day, we shoot,
For every hour of rain and sunshine lent,
    Deepen our glowing hues, and drive our root;
        And as our heads we lift,
        Record each added gift,
And bear to God’s high will, and man’s support, our fruit.
O Leader thou of earth’s exulting quire,
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    Thou with a first-born’s royal rights endued,
Wilt thou alone be dumb? alone desire
    Renew’d the gifts so oft in vain renew’d?
        Then sicken, fret, and pine,
        As one thy head they shine,
And wither ’mid the bliss of boundless plentitude?
Oh, come! And, as thy due, our concert lead.
    Glory to him, the Lord of life and light,
Who nursed our tender leaf, our colours spread,
    And gave thy body mind, the first-born’s right,
        By which thy flight may cleave
        The starry pole, and leave
Thy younger mates below in death’s unbroken light. (50-70)
This call to action by the flowers is all the more interesting if we consider the garden’s 
doctrine a construction of the mind. The speaker imagines and thoroughly convinces 
himself that he needs to live and teach the virtues of his garden. His projection of nature 
invites him to live as the flowers do: “Oh, come! And, as thy due,” the host chants 
in unison, “our concert lead”: join our efforts in lecturing, in spreading the word. By 
listening to what nature says—or by projecting his thoughts onto nature—he commits 
himself to stand for what he perceives as reality. The authority is in the mind, not some 
external object. Assigning nature as the mouthpiece of God places nature in a position of 
authority, which in reality is nothing more than a fictionalized authority, or a self-imposed 
influence on the self. 
 The fact that nature’s authority is a construction of the mind is exactly what 
Dickinson critiques in “‘Nature’ is what We see –.” Her use of the plural pronoun “We” 
shows that the speaker generates knowledge from her social standpoint—what she 
sees and what she hears. Like the speaker in “Garden Lecture,” Dickinson’s speaker 
recognizes that there is an external nature separate from herself. She uses her self-created 
knowledge—obtained by empirical observation as the speaker in “Garden Lecture”—to 
catalogue and categorize: “Squirrel – Eclipse – the Bumble bee –.” She then uses the 
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catalogues and categories to create meaning: these juxtaposed images must mean that 
“Nature is Heaven –.” 
 Another nature writer and contemporary of Dickinson seems to support the 
assessment that man projects his own meaning onto nature. Emerson was well aware of 
the natural world and human being’s relation to it. He wrote: “[Human] thought—that 
is the Universe. His experience inclines him to behold the procession of facts you call 
the world, as flowing perpetually outward from an invisible, unsounded centre [sic] in 
himself” (“The Transcendentalist” 95). Here, Emerson names human thought, the mind, 
as the universe. Fact, as he says, flows from humanity. Emerson displays what Dickinson 
critiques in this poem—perception is all too often labeled fact. From this quote, Emerson 
implies that fact comes from empirical observation, a very scientific type of conclusion. 
As quoted earlier, Neil Smith explains: 
The human-nature argument dissolves into nothing if for any reason 
at all the externality of nature is denied. For ‘human nature’ to fulfill 
its ideological function there must be a separate nature with its own 
inviolable powers, for it is from this nature that the human-nature draws 
its sustenance. (29) 
Dickinson recognizes the faulty logic of basing human nature on external nature; this is 
the basis of her reasoning that allows her to question nature. To understand this in greater 
depth, then, I need to define both types of nature: external and universal. 
The Dual Concept of Nature: An Inherent Contradiction
To define these two natures, I refer to Neil Smith’s book Uneven Development 
because of his in-depth discussion and analysis of nature and the creation of external and 
universal space. Concerning external nature, Smith writes: “We are used to conceiving 
of nature as external to society, pristine and pre-human” (7). Pristine nature is untouched 
by human hands; it is in a perfect state or in its original condition, unspoiled. Smith 
continues: “External nature is [also defined as]…God-given, [and] autonomous…” (11). 
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This is the nature to which the speaker of “Garden Lecture” looks to find God’s priests. 
The external nature found in “Garden Lecture” appears to have a sense of autonomy; 
the flowers possess a form of intellect that conveys enough credibility for the speaker to 
believe he can find God’s messages. In a sense, “Garden Lecture” and part of Dickinson’s 
“‘Nature’ is what We see –” concludes that a nature exists external to human experience: 
a conceptual space in which humans do not live. If nature does indeed exist separate 
from social existence, then the seasons, patterns, and imprint of nature’s impact on the 
landscape should be viewed as natural, which may help us understand human nature or 
what humans do naturally. 
Believing in an external nature—pristine and autonomous—cannot not last long, 
however; for its existence is more of an illusion than a reality. Humanity eventually 
recognizes that it is still subject to a natural phenomenon that it cannot control at which 
point “the external conception…[—they realize—] gives [it] only part of the picture of 
nature…” (Smith 27). Smith continues: “A concept of nature is [then] necessary by which 
it is possible to explain human societies in nature” (27). In fact it could be argued that it 
is impossible to conceive of nature as external without also viewing nature as universal: 
“Alongside external nature we have human nature, by which is implied that human 
beings and their social behaviors are every bit as natural as the so-called external aspects 
of nature” (11). Universal nature is the nature which human beings see themselves as a 
part of: the conceptual space in which humans coexist with nature. At the same time we 
try to conceive of nature as separate from ourselves, Smith argues, we also recognize that 
we are affected by and a part of nature. Thus, “the universal concept includes the human 
with the non-human nature.” This contradiction between external and universal nature, 
Smith points out, is “not entirely reconcilable, for at the same time that nature is held 
to be external to human existence, it is simultaneously both external and internal” (11). 
To use the “natural landscape…as the material substratum of [human] daily life,” or to 
impose external nature on universal, is to ignore the contradiction that establishing nature 
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as external stems from a universal perspective on nature. Emerson seemed to overlook 
this contradiction and accept the dual existence of nature by praising the universal. He 
said:
It is the universal nature which gives worth to particular men and things. 
Human life as containing this is mysterious and inviolable, and we hedge 
it round with penalties and laws. All laws derive hence their ultimate 
reason; all express more or less distinctly some command of this supreme 
illimitable essence. (“History” 106)
Emerson recognizes that the universal view of nature creates the meaning, but does 
not question its “inviolable” power. If nature is inviolable, what happens when two 
different concepts of universal nature overlap? To put it another way, what happens 
when two opinions of human nature differ? Where Dickinson distances herself from 
Emerson, then, is when she questions nature’s weight in establishing and enforcing 
social obedience. As we see in “‘Nature’ is what We see –,” her use of quotation marks 
around “Nature” suggests that the concept behind such labeling is subjective. To support 
this “subjectification,” she capitalizes “We” in each first line of the three stanzas, which 
emphasizes the observers’ role as the one creating knowledge out of experience, hinting 
that knowledge is unique to the observer: there is nothing inherent about this knowledge. 
For example, the speaker in “Garden Lecture” can lead the host of nature because he, too, 
is a part of nature: as the flowers’ existence proves there is a God, so does man’s. The 
flowers teach the speaker that his mind is the gift of his birthright; a gift that parallels 
the flowers’ proof of a higher power (67-70). The contradiction comes as the speaker 
fluctuates between seeing himself as a part of nature and simultaneously believing that a 
nature exists without him. As a result, the speaker does not recognize the contradiction 
in him giving himself the birthright. When people overlook that the “I…is the mould 
[sic] into which the world is poured like melted wax”—the word takes shape as the 
individual sees it—Dickinson begins to question her contemporaries’ epistemology (“The 
Transcendentalist” 95). Both Dickinson and Emerson spent much time thinking and 
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writing about nature, and though Dickinson agreed with some transcendentalist virtues, 
she did not believe that nature could be internalized as confidently as Emerson did; 
nature was not ordered and ultimately not knowable. Because so, she believed a skewed 
internalization and understanding of nature should not be used to impose social identity. 
Now that we understand that nature’s meaning is created within the individual—
not inherent to its existence—we need to explore the creation of meaning within the self 
more closely. More explicitly than in “‘Nature’ is what We see –,” Dickinson identifies 
the relationship between external and universal nature in her poem “The Outer – from the 
Inner” (Fr 450) and breaks down the creation of meaning into three categories: created, 
regulated, and published: 
 
The Outer – from the Inner
Derives it’s magnitude – 
‘Tis Duke, or Dwarf, according 
As is the central mood – 
The fine – unvarying Axis
That regulates the Wheel – 
Though Spokes – spin – more conspicuous
And fling a dust – the while. 
The Inner – paints the Outer – 
The Brush without the Hand – 
It’s Picture publishes – precise – 
As is the inner Brand – 
 
On fine –Arterial Canvas – 
A Cheek – perchance a Brow – 
The Star’s whole secret – in the Lake – 
Eyes were not meant to know. 
The speaker of this poem is consciously aware of the difference between external and 
universal as she uses words like “Outer” and “Inner.” She emphasizes that the “central 
mood,” “Axis,” and “inner Brand” give meaning to the external or that the external 
originates in subjectivity, not the universal, as Emerson wrote that the “the procession 
of facts…[flow from the] centre [sic] in himself.” The first three stanzas categorize 
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progressive steps in the process of creating the “Outer.” In the first stanza, the speaker 
notices that the “Inner / Derives.” To derive is to create, form, or obtain something. This 
could be literal or figurative, perhaps deriving an idea, concept, or even a definition of 
something; either way the source of meaning springs from the self. What the “Inner” 
derives is the Outer’s “magnitude – / ‘Tis Duke or Dwarf.” The shape and size or the 
amount of significance and influence the “Outer” has on the speaker is based on her 
“central mood.” 
The second stanza moves from deriving to regulating as the “unvarying Axis 
/ …regulates the Wheel.” Now that the meaning of the “Outer” has been derived, the 
“Inner” also “regulates,” controls and preserves that meaning. The speaker recognizes 
that though the wheel’s spokes seem to spin with greater intensity from the “more 
conspicuous” rotation as seen from the “fling [of] dust,” the “Wheel” still spins on “The 
fine – unvarying Axis.” The individual maintains the illusion of fact. Meaning is derived 
and regulated from the “Inner” (subjective) according to the speaker. 
 As the first two stanzas establish and maintain meaning that can only be seen 
by the creator alone, the third stanza moves to publishing: the act of making something 
public or perceptible to an audience or people other than the creator. “The Picture 
publishes” what the “Inner Brand” paints. This act of painting and publishing does two 
things. First, it sets up the potential for an individual to metaphorically construct an 
image of the outer based on the inner. Second, as the individual publishes the inner brand, 
she now has influence on others. As she sets “– precise –” within dashes, Dickinson 
purposely separates the idea from the lines before and after, showing that the painting 
is only as accurate as the manufacturer’s interpretation or “ Inner Brand.” “– Precise –,” 
then, emphasizes the creator’s individualized knowledge rather than an objective truth. 
This individualized knowledge has the potential to create behavior and influence others. 
Integrating these three stanzas shows that the “Inner—” or the individual—creates, 
regulates, and publishes knowledge about the “Outer.” 
22
The relationship between external and universal nature, then, is that the individual 
unconsciously bisects nature into two incongruous parts, ignoring the point that the 
individual can never shed a subjective point of view. From conceptualization of an idea to 
the point of sharing that idea with others, the world around the individual is seen through 
that individual’s own perspective; the knowledge about external nature is not inherent 
to its existence. Nature’s significance is based and controlled within the individual; and 
for an illusion to maintain its influence, it must be preserved by the individual, not by 
external factors. Though the construction of the outer seems so obvious, the speaker 
creates and still solidifies his knowledge as fact. The speaker does note, however, that it 
is difficult to discern from first glance whether the spokes of the wheel—the “Outer”— 
are the ones spinning the wheel, not the axle spinning the spokes, showing that the 
origin of the weight and authority of nature is difficult to identify. The speaker ends the 
poem supporting this illusion of the wheel by comparing this knowledge creation to 
the reflection of stars in a lake: “The Star’s whole secret” is only a secret because it is 
maintained in the internal. The star’s secret and all of external nature becomes a metaphor 
for what is held within the “Inner.” Smith supports this as he quotes Marx, saying, 
“Nature separate from society has no meaning since a ‘nature that preceded human 
history…today no longer exists anywhere’…. Even to posit nature as external to society 
is literally absurd since the very act of positing nature requires entering a certain relation 
with nature” (32). To develop this idea further, Smith critiques the basis of modern 
science, much of which is built on the logic of Newton. He writes: 
When he watched the apple fall, Newton did not ask about the social 
forces and events that led to the planting of the apple tree and the design 
of the garden, dictating the precise location of the falling apple. Nor did he 
ask about the domestication of the fruit trees that gave the apple its form. 
He asked, rather, about the ‘natural’ event, defined in abstraction from its 
social context. (15)
In this example Smith shows how early science tries to understand nature by positioning 
it external from social context; however, if society looks to an external nature for 
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meaning, the social should be considered. Dickinson understands that universal 
nature can never be fully understood, especially when confused with the external. 
As I will mention later, one reason this is important to our discussion of Dickinson’s 
poetry is that nature is “incommensurable,” as Paul Crumbley states, because it is 
conceived or constructed out of the dualism of external and universal nature. Nature is 
incommensurable because it is always socially constructed; it can never be understood 
by itself. Whatever is known performs a purely pragmatic function and should not be 
confused with what is—with a nature that perpetually eludes understanding. But this 
social construction of nature is hidden by the belief that nature is external, which is 
precisely why Dickinson questions its weight. 
Part of Dickinson’s critique of nature as authoritative is her belief that nature can 
never accurately nor fully be understood and is thus always misinterpreted. In the last 
stanza of “‘Nature’ is what We see –,” she points out that
 
“Nature” is what We know – 
But have no Art to say –
So impotent our Wisdom is 
To Her Sincerity –
Again, the quotations around “Nature” suggest a level of subjectivity, indicating that the 
nature “we know” is not the true nature. Because we “have no Art to say,” any attempt to 
interpret nature will be inaccurate; we simply do not have the ability to represent nature 
from an objective point of view. Our insistent efforts to understand nature can never 
produce a complete picture, thus our wisdom is impotent to nature’s sincerity—“sincere” 
defined as “Not falsified or perverted in any way…. True, exact” (“Sincere”). By using 
the word “Wisdom,” it seems that Dickinson may agree that nature contains truth—and 
that humanity may have the intellect to make our own meaning—but her quibble is with 
nature’s authoritative use to impose social codes on others. 
She develops the point that nature cannot be fully understood in her poem 
“What mystery pervades a well!” (Fr 1433). The speaker distinguishes between nature’s 
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understanding of itself and humanity’s understanding of nature. As the speaker looks 
down a well, she becomes overwhelmed with “What mystery pervades [the] well!” (1). 
The speaker recognizes that all she can see is a small piece of nature, “But just his lid of 
face” (6), and that nature hides the majority of itself from humanity’s understanding as 
the face is like looking into bottomless “abyss” (8). Then the speaker notices grass that 
grows next to the well with a sense of confidence. She says, 
The grass does not appear afraid,
I often wonder he 
Can stand so close and look so bold
At what is awe to me. (9-12)
The speaker’s wonder or “awe” is in response to the grass’s bold stance at what is such 
a mystery to herself. This mystery apparently leaves the speaker somewhat afraid. But 
because the grass is part of nature, the speaker recognizes that it has no reason to fear. For 
as she writes in another poem that “Of Nature I shall have enough” when she becomes 
“Entitled to a Bumble bee’s / Familiarities –” (Fr 1170, 1, 3-4), so would she have the 
confidence the grass embodies if she were privy to nature’s secrets. As one can never 
“have enough” or be satisfied and confident, as one can never have the “Art to say,” one 
cannot justify social codes based on a societal understanding of nature unless that one 
becomes familiar with the nature that grass and bumblebees know. Dickinson claims in 
“What mystery…” that “…nature is a stranger…” and that those “that cite her most / 
Have never passed her haunted house / Nor simplified her ghost” (17-20). She writes that 
“those who know [nature], know her less / the nearer her they get” (23-24). Any authority 
nature seems to contain is, then, a fiction of the mind.  
The Panopticon
 Because nature is often conflated with religion, nature easily becomes an 
authoritative influence on behavior. But not only does nature seem to contain influential 
power, but a deified nature seems to combine with what one considers natural, resulting 
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in a unconscious epistemology which individuals then internalize. In order to clarify how 
assumptions about nature shape individual thought, it will be helpful to review Michel 
Foucault’s discussion of the panopticon. In her book Literary Theory: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, Mary Klages summarizes Foucault’s theory stating that he was “interested 
in the creation of ‘good’ subjects who obey rules…because they’ve internalized a belief 
in the truth of those rules, and ‘bad’ subjects who disobey because they don’t believe in 
them” (144). Foucault wanted to find what motivated people to obedience. Foucault’s 
theory of the panopticon, then, can be used as a metaphor that describes how individuals 
internalize social codes, which act as a form of behavioral surveillance (145). Once 
internalized, this influence appears natural rather than constructed to the individual. The 
panopticton, then, represents the individual’s “awareness that [he or she] is always being 
watched,” which persuades her to believe that she must behave a certain way. The person 
fears being punished for disobedience and thus obeys the pervading ideology. 
My argument in relation to Dickinson’s poetry is that the panoptical influence of 
society threatens agency as it limits individuals’ vision of possible choices, resulting in 
obedient subjects who unknowingly follow and sometimes are unwilling to change or 
recognize true influences that shape their value. An important part of this influence for 
Dickinson’s critique of nature is how the panoptical influence is difficult to recognize; 
its origin and what maintains the influence are elusive. As spokes of a wheel in “The 
Outer – from the Inner” seem to be the source of spinning and not the axle, a panoptical 
influence of the inner-self creating meaning about the natural world is hard to discern or 
notice. The origin of this influence is elusive because social codes are internalized. When 
internalized, they are often misunderstood as the natural order of things, especially when 
conflated with religion. As we saw in “Garden Lecture,” the authority placed on nature’s 
flowers hid the fact that the speaker was constructing the image of authority. What 
maintains the panoptical influence is the fear of stepping outside the “natural” order of 
things. This fear keeps society in check. 
26
Dickinson’s poem “Much Madness is divinest Sense –” (Fr 620) is a nice 
representation of the fear that accompanies stepping outside the boundaries of normality:
Much Madness is divinest Sense –
To a discerning Eye –
Much Sense – the starkest Madness –
’Tis the Majority
In this, as all, prevail –
Assent – and you are sane – 
Demur – you’re straightway dangerous –
And handled with a Chain –
Because the speaker gives two options—assent or demur—she seems to understand that 
non-conformity runs serious risks. Identifying both options suggests that to “Demur” 
from sanity is done purposefully and with the understanding that “you’re straightway 
dangerous – / And handled with a Chain –.” This awareness that the speaker displays 
and her use of the word “straightway” indicate that to consciously depart from what was 
accepted as normal was to commit some sort of social suicide. Why would someone 
knowingly place the label of “Madness” on themselves? The consequence would be 
immediate. “Straightway,” one would be banned from social acceptance. The nineteenth 
century was a time when many feared mental institutions. It was socially unacceptable 
to be institutionalized, and it was certainly unacceptable to have a family member 
institutionalized. In his book A History of Psychiatry, Edward Shorter quotes a parent 
ignoring her son’s severe case of depression: “It’s inconsiderate of him not just to pull 
himself together…because his three sisters are just coming into marriageable age and 
their suitors will surely be frightened off. Nobody wants to marry into a family with 
mental illness” (115). The societal panopticon blinds this parent. Rather than caring for 
the mental health of the son, the parent is more concerned about the social consequences 
for his sisters, which might occur because of his “madness.” As this example shows, the 
panoptical influence remains elusive as the consequence of breaking social codes were  
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far too drastic. Rather than straightway be banned, it was better to straightway accept 
such influence. 
This is not the only poem that shows she recognized such influence, however. 
Dickinson’s poem, “One need not be a Chamber – to be Haunted –” (Fr 407) conveys that 
she was aware of panoptical influence and its elusiveness. In her book Emily Dickinson’s 
Gothic: Goblin with a Guage, Daneen Wardrop suggests that Dickinson’s choice to use 
gothic language enabled her to identify and question such influence. She writes, “Women 
writers have traditionally used the gothic technique of doubling to address the reproval 
of women that patriarchal society causes them to internalize. As such, doubling proves 
an efficacious technique for critiquing a power structure that relies on psychological 
manipulation” (112). This technique helps Dickinson to identify and bypass the 
panopticon’s elusiveness. Wardrop calls this linguistic ability “character doubling”: “The 
technique of character doubling…bifurcates the world into inner and outer states—most 
frequently the acceptable, social self as opposed to the unsocialized, libidinous self” (97). 
As character doubling helped Dickinson, it also helps readers be aware of panoptical 
influence. The speaker of “One need not be a Chamber –” sets up her character doubling 
by identifying an internal and external space: 
One need not be a Chamber – to be Haunted – 
One need not be a House – 
The Brain has Corridors – surpassing
Material Place –
Character doubling begins with recognizing there are two types of spaces: physical and 
mental. Here, the speaker suggests that an apparition—the one haunting—does not need 
physical space to present itself. As Dickinson makes the reader aware that it is not the 
external world that one should fear, but the internal, she helps the reader begin to question 
his or her self-construction of the external world. The next two stanzas develop this 
awareness but also introduce the idea that questioning one’s internal critics can be unsettling: 
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Far safer, of a midnight meeting
External Ghost
Than it’s interior confronting – 
That cooler Host –
Far Safer, through an Abbey gallop,
The Stones a’chase – 
Than unarmed, one’s a’self encounter –  
In lonesome Place – 
The introductory phrase “Far Safer” and the following conjunction “Than” in both 
stanzas, as well as the word “unarmed,” show the uneasiness or vulnerability created in 
questioning one’s self. Automatically, the speaker compares external hauntings to the 
internal. The speaker hopes to make the reader aware of his or her internal threat. The 
“self encounter” and “interior confronting” are much more difficult to face than one’s 
external fears. In the fourth stanza, Dickinson shows the panopticon’s elusiveness:
Ourself behind ourself, concealed –
Should startle most – 
Assassin hid in our Apartment 
Be Horror’s least – 
“Horror’s least” fear should not be what may be hidden inside the physical space of our 
apartment; it should be what is hidden in the corridors of the brain. Nevertheless:
The Body – borrows a Revolver –
He bolts the Door – 
O’erlooking a superior spectre – 
Or More –
All too often, as the speaker concludes, does the individual ignore or overlook the 
panoptical influence. The panopticon’s elusiveness is a psychological haunt, tricking the 
individual to think the battle to fight is external when really it is internal. As Dickinson 
implies, it is easy to disregard the fright—the “superior spectre”—which lies within when 
we are too concerned with the external. The uneasiness and vulnerability formed by 
identifying the self as the creator of an apparition causes a self-defense reaction. 
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Externally, this seems incorrect: “The Body – borrows a Revolver –” and “bolts the Door 
–.” But this gut reaction overlooks what could be more important.
Nature Becomes A Panoptical Influence: Historical Context
Understanding that society’s panoptical influence is elusive is important 
when considered within Dickinson’s historical context. Because nature held such an 
authoritative influence, it often became an image and metaphor to identify virtues that 
were deemed appropriately and thus “naturally” feminine. These virtues were then used 
to define her role and duties in the home and to discourage her intellectual pursuits. In her 
seminal essay “The Cult of True Womanhood,” Barbara Welter explains that that floral 
dictionaries of the time used “the language of flowers” to enforce the extreme doctrine 
that for a woman to lose purity was worse than death: “a dried white rose symbolized 
‘Death Preferable to Loss of Innocence.’” 2 By divine appointment, women contained a 
certain level of purity, a virtue that should not be compromised. Speaking of such virtues, 
Welter writes that “God, nature and the Bible ‘enjoin on the sex, and she cannot violate 
[her virtues] with impunity’” (60).3 Women were spurred into obedience by fearing the 
consequences of breaking a natural order: “Purity was as essential as piety to a young 
woman, its absence as unnatural and unfeminine” (my emphasis 46). Losing purity 
led not to just an unfortunate circumstance, losing purity meant she lost who she was: 
a woman. Disobeying nature’s order and God’s will resulted in sexual exile: “A ‘fallen 
woman’ was a ‘fallen angel,’ unworthy of the celestial company of her sex.” Magazines 
of the time categorized this exile into mental and social consequences: “To contemplate 
the loss of purity brought tears; to be guilty of such a crime…brought madness or 
2. This is directly quoted from Barbara Welter’s essay on page 46. The floral diction-
ary she quotes from and the direct quote itself comes from the book Lady’s Book 
of Flowers and Poetry, page 239.
3. Welter makes this conclusion based on an essay or thing from the Mt. Holyoke 
Female Seminary, pg. 13. 
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death.” Women were warned to not only avoid the loss of purity—by consequence of 
madness and banishment from society—they were also warned not to think about such 
things. Either way, whether contemplated or acted out, a loss of purity brought social 
exile or a form of internal reproval. The thought in itself would bring pain and sadness, 
which is where the panopticon enters the discussion again, making Dickinson’s “Much 
Madness…” even more applicable. Breaking the natural order set by God and nature held 
mental and social consequences, clearly—according to nineteenth-century logic—women 
held virtues that they naturally adhered to. 
Because virtues such as purity were so clearly found in nature, nature could also 
be used to define woman’s position in the home. Her main duty was to have a positive 
influence on her family, particularly the men. Welter writes that woman’s intricacies and 
influence functioned like nature: “‘in secret’ her love goes forth to the world to regulate 
its pulsation, and send forth from its heart, in pure and temperate flow, the life-giving 
current’” (Welter 52). 4 As we saw in “Garden Lecture,” women—the flowers—brought 
man (the speaker and gardener) back to God simply by their existence, by the way they 
lived their lives. This existence had such a strong effect that it called the speaker to 
action in the end of the poem. Interestingly, it is somewhat confusing that the speaker of 
“Garden Lecture” would take the traditionally passive image of flowers and use it as an 
aggressive founder of doctrine, assuming the more masculine role of preacher. But on 
another level, this makes sense. According to Welter, women in the nineteenth century 
were thought to be the source of virtue in the home: it was in “her home [that] woman 
performed her great task of bringing men back to God” (54). Her way to contribute to 
society was through raising and training the men, the son and husband.  In addition, 
“Woman was expected to dispense comfort and cheer…so that brothers, husbands and 
sons would not go elsewhere in search of a good time” (55). Perhaps this is what is meant 
4.  This is taken from the Woman in America: Her Work and Her Reward.
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in “Garden Lecture” when the garden’s host reproves the speaker, saying “Wilt thou…
alone desire / Renew’d the gifts so oft in vain renew’d?” (59-60). Why seek for a good 
time when good time is renewed by the virtues and influence of the woman of the house? 
The fact that flowers are preaching human virtue and correct moral conduct is not so 
uncanny, then. This type of pontificating was natural for women in the nineteenth century. 
Thus it makes sense that the speaker labels his garden a “her” in the second line while 
posing the flowers as aggressive establishers of social and religious doctrine. 
In addition to using nature as a way to establish woman’s role in the home, 
nature’s proclaimed virtues by society helped woman keep what was most important 
in perspective; she was taught that intellectual pursuits were not part of her natural 
course. Welter writes that woman was “expected to have a special affinity for flowers…
[because she] ‘never appears more truly in her sphere than when she divides her time 
between her domestic avocations and the culture of flowers’”5 (57). Judith Farr supports 
this view in her book The Gardens of Emily Dickinson. She writes that “to be a notable 
gardener was a much more acceptable avocation for mid-Victorian women (meant to be 
the angel of their house) than to be a poet” (4). Farr’s evidence of this claim is a close 
reading of Dickinson’s obituary, written by her sister-in-law Susan Gilbert Dickinson. 
The obituary, Farr infers, emphasizes Dickinson’s gardening skills over her ingenuity as 
a poet: “Although Susan writes admiringly of Emily’s poems…it is to her gardening that 
she attributes technical, virtuosic knowledge” (5). Farr suggests that Susan was “perhaps 
anxious after the poet’s death to make a final apology for Emily’s reclusiveness” (5). In 
such an attempt, Farr explains that “the first of Emily’s talents that Susan praises is her 
gift for growing flowers, as if her girlhood friend and sister-in-law had a holy touch that 
originated in her goodness and sympathy with nature” (6). Such emphasis on Dickinson’s 
 
5.  The Lady’s Token. 
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gardening in her obituary rather than genius as a poet, Welter might suggest, is because 
“women were discouraged from being literary and intellectual” (52). 
Grace Greenwood, a contemporary of Emily Dickinson, cautions a friend in a 
letter written in 1846, titled, “To An Unrecognized Poetess,” that the “joy of inspiration” 
from literary and intellectual endeavors “can never be felt by woman with great intensity; 
at least can never satisfy her” (emphasis in original 312). Grace’s friend had disclosed to 
Grace that she had  
often said, and thought, that I would willingly resign all social and 
domestic ties, and live lonely and unloved, if only I might possess a tithe 
of Mrs. Hemans’s genius and reputation. Fame’s clarion voice has been to 
me ‘the voice of a charmer,’ and when I have spoken contemptuously of 
popularity, and with approbation of a woman’s holy and humble office, my 
heart was not with it. (emphasis in original 310)
In response to such sentiment, Grace titled and published her own letter “To An 
Unrecognized Poetess,” emphasizing the inevitable fate (by natural order) of the woman 
who forgets that her “well-spring of joy is in the heart” (312). Grace’s response was to 
help her friend reposition her understanding of women’s true role. A woman cannot be 
recognized for her intellectual or literary pursuits because she contains “a joy which 
must…be far more deep and full, than any which the million can bestow; one which 
precedes, and is independent of…fame.” It was her virtue and correct place in the home 
that secured woman’s joy. These outweighed her intellectual pursuits, which could never 
satisfy. Thus we see that women’s agency in the nineteenth century, under the gaze of the 
cultural panopticon, was threatened: if intellectual pursuits could not “satisfy” women, 
then should they not seek after that which could satisfy? 
Dickinson speaks of this influence in her poem “Nature and God – I neither 
knew” (Fr 803). The first stanza reads: 
Nature and God – I neither knew 
Yet Both so well knew Me 
They startled, like Executors 
Of my identity – 
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The agency essential to creating identity would hopefully be in the hands of the 
individual; however, the speaker is suggesting that her identity is determined by an 
executor. This is where we see a panoptical influence. The fact that “They”—Nature 
and God—“startled” (moved quickly and swiftly) seems to suggest an unconscious 
or uncontrollable influence (“Startle”). If a woman broke free of such influence, she 
would be a social outcast. This helps us understand why there is a contradiction in the 
relationship of the speaker and Nature and God: “I neither knew… / Yet Both so well 
knew Me.” The speaker was unaware that his or her pervading ideology was stemming 
from Nature and God. The panoptical influence and its elusiveness came from a 
subconscious, internalization of social codes, which led the speaker to believe these 
codes were unquestionable, close to unchangeable. It makes sense, then, that the speaker 
feels that the executor almost acts as cultural determination. The speaker’s mental 
monitor regulates his or her creation of identity because of the threat of exile: “Never 
unsex yourself for greatness” (Greenwood 311).  This influence, coming from combined 
authority figures such as God and Nature, has a panoptical influence on the speaker’s 
psyche. The speaker feels that she has no control over her own will, almost losing control 
of the creation of her own identity.
Despite this threat to agency, Dickinson ends her poem “Nature and God – I 
neither knew” by subverting the dominant ideology, reclaiming her speaker’s will. Her 
second stanza reads: 
Yet Neither told – that I could learn – 
My Secret as secure 
As Herschel’s private interest 
Or Mercury’s Affair – 
This second stanza is almost a complete reversal of the first, and the hinge is “Yet.” 
The “Yet” in this stanza (line five) sets forth the subversion in a concession/assertion 
relationship. The speaker first yields to panoptical influence, then in the second stanza the 
speaker is set free in secret. Living in secret, the speaker puts forth the illusion that she 
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bends to social codes but actually lives otherwise. This is further supported by the simile, 
“As Herschel’s private interest” (7). Herschel was an astronomer, the one attributed with 
finding Uranus. His interest was in the stars; he looked through a new lens that could see 
farther than science has seen before. Metaphorically, Herschel lives in secret (the confines 
of his telescope) with new truths and facts about the universe; and perhaps, then, so does 
the speaker: the secret being, “that I could learn” in line five. The speaker is reclaiming 
his or her agency despite the cultural influence, her affair as Mercury’s: conniving, 
somewhat a trickster (8). 
Comparing the “Secret” from “Nature and God – I neither knew” and the last 
line—“Or More”—from “One need not be a Chamber” reveals the fear of finding 
society’s impression on agency. The speaker of “One need not be a Chamber,” as 
Wardrop says, ends the poem lingering “on the rich and horrific ambiguity of ‘Or 
More….’ A psychological horror” (115). The real terror is not the assassin hidden in the 
apartment, not the materialized self with revolver, but the unarmed self-encounter of 
finding the panopticon at the seat of influence. The ambiguity of “Or More,” however, 
also leaves room to suggest that perhaps the “More” is as the “Secret” in “Nature and 
God – I neither knew.” Finding the self behind the self reveals the panoptical influence 
but also reveals to the speaker the power she had all along to determine her own identity. 
The first two lines of stanzas two and three in “One need not be a Chamber” refer to 
“Material place[s],” or physical space, being haunted. The second two refer to the 
internal space of one’s mind as haunted. The fourth stanza, however, breaks this pattern. 
This stanza begins with the internal self—hidden in the corridors of the mind behind 
“ourself”—and ends with the external. This break in pattern is quite noticeable as each 
line in stanzas two, three, and four alternate between a nine and four syllable pattern, 
repeating iambic tetrameter to iambic dimeter lines. Dickinson’s adherence to such a 
strict meter ties these three stanzas together. Breaking the conceptual pattern of external 
to internal, then, suggests that Dickinson may be using words and the pattern of her poem 
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to show what her speaker is suggesting. Perhaps linguistically, the break in this pattern 
reveals the self of the poem. This sudden shift surprises the reader and causes them to 
read “In lonesome Place” and “Ourself behind ourself, concealed” directly connected to 
one another. These two internal ideas are not separated by the external. This positions 
the internal next to lonesome place. The speaker’s goal is to get the reader to reveal the 
self concealed behind the self. The speaker, then, may be suggesting that apparitions, 
“External Ghosts,” and “Stones a’chase” may receive their meaning from within. They 
receive material existence because of the importance the self imposes on such ideas. 
Either way the panoptical influence has still created a fear of facing one’s self “unarmed... 
/ In lonesome Place –.” As defined in the Emily Dickinson Lexicon, “lonesome” could 
mean secluded from society. The fear of facing the self, then, could be the fear of being 
segregated from society. Maintaining a panoptical influence, or at least not questioning it, 
keeps the person connected to society. The fear of self-creation could be a panopticon in 
itself. Dickinson may be saying that not only is there a social influence keeping agency 
from the person, but the desire not to face one’s self (for fear or lack of desire) is in a 
sense a panoptical influence: “ourselves behind ourself, concealed.”
Understanding Dickinson’s perspective on nature helps clarify how to be aware 
of panoptical influence. She might suggest that a dose or an internalization of social 
codes should not be taken as a supplemental vitamin for self-creation. Nature holding 
an authoritative influence, paired with other authorities or not, threatens the agency of 
the individual. Accepting that individuals socially construct nature and its authoritative 
weight allows individuals to create not just their own identity but space for acceptance 
of change, fluctuation, and difference. Realizing that external nature can never be 
fully understood means the acceptance of a shifting definition of nature that allows for 
ambiguity in self-creation. Wardrop says, “Emily Dickinson owns her own kind of double 
vision which questions the foundations of rational epistemology” (97). Dickinson’s use 
of gothic language invites individuals to realize the possibility for multiple selves. In 
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Paul Crumbley’s chapter “Dickinson’s Uses of Spiritualism: The ‘Nature’ of Democratic 
Belief” he posits that Dickinson’s use of spiritual language allows for democratic thought. 
He concludes that a constantly changing nature deserves democratic thought to define 
it—or accept its incommensurability. It is the application of this and the “relentlessly 
responsive requirement of democratic thought that preserves the sovereignty of the 
individual by making individual choice an ongoing process” (130). If individual choice 
becomes an ongoing process, then individuals choose for themselves whether they want 
to be a housewife or an intellectual woman. The panopticon hides no choices from the 
individual: the fear of breaking social codes may still exist, but at least the individual is 
aware of more than one choice.
To believe certain social behaviors natural, Dickinson might suggest, is to 
give up your will. Perhaps we could sum this argument up into one phrase: beware 
of the consequences of Anthropopsychism: “The ascription of mental faculties or 
characteristics like those of man to the Divine Being or the agencies at work in nature” 
(“Anthropopsychism”). But as Neil Smith writes, this universalizing of nature can be 
seen in our own day: “The overriding function of the universal conception today is 
to invest certain social behaviors with the status of natural events by which is meant 
that these behaviors and characteristics are normal, God-given, unchangeable” (29). 
Considering the word “unchangeable” is exactly the point. Emily Dickinson would 
say behavior and assumptions that govern behavior are changeable (with democratic 
thought and a willingness to question one’s internal belief system). Again we see another 
example of nature imposing social codes when Grace Greenwood wrote, “Don’t trample 
on the flowers, while longing for the stars” (311). Dickinson would most likely reply, 
“Apparently with no surprise / To any happy Flower / The Frost beheads it at it’s play…” 
(Fr 1668). Judith Farr points out, “Although Dickinson often concurred in her poems and 
letters…that ‘Beauty is its own excuse for being,’ she also recognized the cruelty with 
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which beauty is destroyed in nature” (116). Emily Dickinson recognizes nature’s intrinsic 
value, yet at the same time questions the use of nature to impose social codes, especially 
when threatening agency. 
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TRACES OF NATURE: FROST’S RECIPROCAL, REVELATORY PROCESS
Robert Frost actively sought to understand the natural world through a 
combination of external inspiration and internal human imagination. As an early 
twentieth-century writer, Frost acknowledged that meaning taken from nature was 
socially constructed. Where he differed from many modernists, however, was in his belief 
that created meaning still had value as a source for truth originating in external nature. In 
his book Going by Contraries: Robert Frost’s Conflict with Science, Robert Hass points 
out that Frost “could not abandon belief in an external source of truth that might serve as 
a bulwark for traditional moral value and religious belief” (53). His attachment to both 
invented and discovered meaning provides Frost his unique view of nature. It is in this 
aspect that Frost differs most profoundly from Emily Dickinson. Where Dickinson claims 
that we cannot know nature, Frost asserts that nature is the only thing worth knowing. 
Using nature as a playground for his imagination, Frost discovers the source most central 
to his poetic process. Dickinson’s creative approach critiques epistemology founded in 
nature, concentrating on cultural constructions of nature to challenge social codes that 
unnaturally restrict individual freedom. Frost looks to nature as a vehicle to understand 
the purpose and meaning of his creative experience. As Hass puts it, Frost “desperately 
sought divine purpose in the universe…in an effort to stabilize his life” (43), and Frost’s 
use of nature in conflict with the epistemology of science allowed him to “find greater 
solace and meaning in the world” (53). Frost achieves his greatest moments of clarity by 
what I describe as “revelation.” The word “revelation” best expresses Frost’s relationship 
to nature because he often builds his poems around moments of epiphany, where nature 
speaks out of mystery, revealing itself briefly without shedding its final and ultimate 
impenetrability. Any sudden moment of clarity is followed by mystery. Nature is never 
fully revealed for Frost; his efforts allow him a glimpse of meaning, leaving him with 
a hope for understanding and motivation to continue reading nature. Where Frost treats 
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nature as an object to look at and temporarily find meaning in, Dickinson demonstrates 
that despite one’s best efforts, nature remains beyond our reach. Yet, as much as they 
differ, they both have a fascination with the central role nature plays in human thought. 
The difference, then, is in their belief that nature is or is not knowable. For 
instance, we have already discussed how Dickinson disputes the existence of a wholly 
external nature. She claims that “The Outer – from the Inner / Derives it’s magnitude” (Fr 
450) because “The Tents to Nature’s Show / Mistake the Outside for the in” (Fr 1102); 
the understanding of external nature is derived or constructed from a social standpoint 
because the true meaning of nature in itself is hidden from our view. Thus Dickinson 
constantly questions society’s belief that it can understand nature defined as inviolable, 
pristine, and autonomous, allowing her to challenge human nature’s ideological function. 
In a similar sense, Frost challenges his contemporaries’ use of nature as a proof that there 
is no greater being. Frost, however, seems less concerned with how uses of nature in the 
early twentieth century influence society and focuses mainly on the way imagination 
combines with nature to reveal sources of understanding and spiritual purpose. His use 
of nature attempts to cement a belief in a higher power. His goal is to find the spiritual 
existence of nature in order to confirm his own spiritual existence. Thus, Frost’s approach 
blurs the distinction between universal and external nature; at the same time that he looks 
into nature to find meaning, he also considers himself part of nature—an appendage, 
attached, inseparable. 
The poem that prefaces his first book of poetry, “The Pasture,” hints at this and 
is a complex example of the need to find a source of truth yet still use the imagination. 
The pronoun in the first lines of both stanzas places the speaker in direct contact with 
nature that is if anything too real: “I’m going out to clean…” and “I’m going out to 
fetch…” (1 and 5). The speaker’s announcement that he is cleaning and fetching from 
nature shows his desire to discover what nature conceals. His venture into the pasture to 
fetch and “watch the water clear” shows his search for meaning in nature (3). Along with 
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fetching the calf he also goes “to rake the leaves away” (2). Metaphorically, the human 
imagination rakes leaves away so that nature’s clear stream of water can then reveal its 
depths. This action shows his belief that he needs to be part of the receiving of something 
from nature: without his raking the leaves away, the water would not clear. Frost, not 
so explicitly concerned about the social implications of nature as Dickinson is, looks to 
nature for personal reasons. He seeks revelation. Compared to Dickinson, his approach 
is not concerned with the way nature serves cultural aims; his more individualistic 
relationship to nature is reciprocal and personal: to gain or seek imaginative freedom in 
order to find spiritual existence. 
Concluding that Dickinson’s and Frost’s uses of nature remain as complete 
opposites would be a mistake, however. The way they approach nature may differ but 
their aims are quite similar. Both understand that knowledge founded in nature cannot 
hold an authoritative role; both stress the importance of an active—not passive—
relationship to nature as essential to fighting complacency; both seek to redefine nature 
in order to give constructive and defining power to the individual; and both ultimately 
seek to empower agency to avoid and fight hegemonic structures. To consider these 
similarities, then, we need to look at Frost’s approach to nature in more depth. We 
will see that if Frost believes that nature does reveal itself and that man can interpret 
it—a shared role in meaning making—then he also recognizes these two things: the 
precariousness of this knowledge and that expectation hinders revelation. Responsibility 
for how best to think about nature, then, must constantly be rediscovered and persuasive, 
even if only temporarily recognizing the limits of such knowledge. 
To assemble Frost’s use of nature in his own language, I look first to his poem 
“Gathering Leaves” as it is a prime example of how the individual takes an active role in 
receiving revelation. The poem takes up the theme of “The Pasture” as the speaker goes 
“out to clean” and rake away leaves (the speakers of both poems actively take part in 
cleaning nature). But the speaker of “Gathering Leaves” is not here to clear only but also 
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to “gather,” as the title points out. This word highlights one of Frost’s most interesting 
questions: what is the individual’s role in receiving revelation from nature: are we passive 
recipients or active participants? “Gathering” implies an assertive action to collect or sort 
and order the scattered. As the speaker states in the last stanza that “a crop is a crop” (22), 
“Gathering” could be thought of as harvesting. If to gather is to harvest, nature will have 
produced some sort of fruit or crop to be harvested and the individual must initiate the 
gathering. From the title itself, then, Frost suggests that the individual must be an active 
participant in revelation. The activity required, as he states here, is that the individual 
must gather for himself to receive any sort of meaning from nature. 
The gathering required by the individual who searches for meaning is more 
complex than simply picking up leaves, however. If the revelatory process were not more 
complex, it would be easy to rebut Frost’s point that one needs to simply “pick up” or 
gather revelation: revelation gathered would be a product of the imagination, subjective 
and only important to the individual who gathered. The focus point and conflict of 
the poem, however, is the difficulty with which the speaker gathers. The difficulty is 
displayed in at least two ways: one, nature’s qualities are elusive and slippery (leaves are 
hard to pick up); and two, one can never be sure of how useful the revelation will be (was 
picking up the leaves worth it?). The first stanza demonstrates nature’s slipperiness:
Spades take up leaves
No better than spoons,
And bags full of leaves
Are light as balloons. (1-4)
The clumsy attempt to pick up leaves with a spade is Frost’s speaker admitting that nature 
cannot be “properly” gathered. Though the task of raking leaves into bags seems easy 
enough, the awkward shoveling seems to suggest that nature resists any sort of gathering. 
Dickinson wrote that “nature is a Stranger” (1433), and Frost’s assertion here agrees that 
humanity’s effort to gather and contain nature keeps nature’s mysteries at a distance. 
Frost’s speaker continues with nature’s elusiveness in the third stanza: 
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the mountains I raise 
Elude my embrace, 
Flowing over my arms 
And into my face. (9-12)
Success in gathering is limited by the leaves’ elusive qualities and because, as Hass 
writes, “human perception [is] simply not sufficient to gain access to the deepest 
mysteries of the universe” (57). Not even tools help: “Spades take up leaves / No better 
than spoons” (1-2). Gathering is not easy. And though the word “gathering” implies 
Frost’s emphasis on active participation in meaning making, to suggest that “gathering” 
alone is the key to revelation does not accurately depict Frost’s search for revelation.
What makes gathering even more difficult is that the speaker cannot be certain 
that what he gathered has any worth. The speaker’s active role in “Gathering Leaves” 
does not guarantee a clear form of revelation. Despite the bags he gathers, his crop’s 
worth is not self-evident or easily understood. At the end of his harvest, all the speaker 
has is nothing more than “bags full of leaves / [as] light as balloons” (3-4). “And what 
have I then?” the speaker rightly asks (16):
Next to nothing for weight, 
And since they grew duller
From contact with earth,
Next to nothing for color. (17-20)
The speaker’s work harvests a crop that is “Next to nothing for use” (21). What good is a 
bag of leaves? The speaker’s strenuous efforts cannot guarantee that the revelation sought 
for will be of any use. If there is no value, what motivation does the speaker have to be 
so active in creating meaning? This hinders the speaker’s efforts to receive revelation 
because of the assumptions he makes when considering the revelation’s value. Robert 
Hass has noticed a similar situation in Frost’s astronomical poems. He writes that “wish 
[often] influences the quality of fact” (64). The speaker’s search for utility causes him 
to recognize other values the leaves may contain. The speaker’s tendency to assume his 
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crop’s usefulness introduces the question: if the revelation is not what we expect, can 
we recognize it as revelation? From this episode, Frost hints that expectation about what 
form revelation appears in can block the individual from discerning the form it comes in. 
Without the last stanza, this reading might leave us thinking that the gathering 
process is fruitless, that because of the lack of utility, the speaker’s bags full of leaves 
mean nothing. He ends his poem contradicting this type of reading: “But a crop is a crop, 
/ And who’s to say where / the harvest shall stop?” (22-24). The poem concludes open-
ended. Though the crop may be “Next to nothing for use”—lacking in utility—the crop 
is still worth having to some degree. The speaker admits that though his bags of leaves 
may be light as balloons, they are still a crop (he recognizes the literal fact despite his 
wish for utility in the end). In this sense the speaker suggests that the meaning or quality 
of revelation does not matter; rather, the fact that revelation exists is what he cares about. 
And with this point of view, “who’s to say where / the harvest shall stop?”
“Gathering Leaves” not only shows that Frost believes an individual must be an 
active participant in the revelatory process to glean any sort of meaning from nature, 
it also subtly demonstrates how “play” and becoming “lost” are necessary factors in 
gathering meaning. As we have seen from this poem so far, Frost’s aim to find more 
meaning in nature than just mechanical evolution requires a concerted effort. Gathering 
is complex. As such, Frost’s playful tone and images fulfill an important role for his 
speaker to conclude so optimistically that “a crop is a crop.” Read in its entirety, 
“Gathering Leaves” feels more like a sing-songy poem, perhaps more light-hearted than 
serious (especially because of the short lines and alternating rhyme patterns). His jovial 
tone emphasizes the playfulness of the speaker’s efforts to gather leaves. The images 
of spoons and balloons with its simple rhyme show Frost’s playfulness with words and 
his imaginative approach to nature. And the third stanza (which reads, “the mountains 
I raise / Elude my embrace, / Flowing over my arms / And into my face”) continues his 
playfulness by almost giving the image of a child playing in piles of leaves. The snapshot 
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of this individual hugging a pile of leaves that overflows into his face also hints at a type 
of play that leads to becoming overwhelmed in nature, almost to the point of becoming 
lost. The combination of these images and tones—highlighting the playfulness that leads 
to becoming lost—is a sort of judgeless encounter with nature suggesting that revelation 
often comes in a form that the individual does not expect. Unlike the speaker in “The 
Pasture” who “cleaned the pasture spring” (1) in order to “watch the water clear” (3)—
perhaps hoping to divine something beneath the murky water—the speaker in “Gathering 
Leaves” clears the ground of leaves for no apparent reason. Though the initial motivation 
for the speaker to rake leaves may have been to clear his yard (he never states so), the 
speaker ends the poem realizing that the leaves themselves are his harvest. Frost’s ability 
to play leads him to conclude “who’s to say where / the harvest shall stop?” These two 
themes suggest that Frost believes one must approach any effort to understand nature 
with curiosity rather than imaginative expectation.
Karl Keller’s comments on the role of “play” in Frost’s poetry helps clarify 
how imagination is necessary to receiving revelation in a poem like “Gathering 
Leaves.” According to Keller, Frost adopted Dickinson’s “play” and ability to “dwell in 
possibility” (Fr 466) as an approach to nature that allowed him to be part of the revelatory 
process. In his chapter “When the Soul is at Play,” Keller points out that Dickinson 
had a profound influence on Frost. He claims that Dickinson’s playful approach to 
poetry in general and certainly towards nature greatly influenced Frost. Keller writes, 
“[Dickinson’s] mischief with poetic form was an indication to [Frost] that she was 
serious about what she was saying and would bend conventions to get it said…that with 
her poetry (and her ideas) she was at play” (314 emphasis in original). It was her form, 
ideas, and the sense that she “was having a good time trying to say it” that Frost admired. 
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Though Frost often criticized writers who broke traditional forms of poetry and wrote 
free verse, he tolerated and even celebrated Dickinson’s writing precisely because of her 
daring ability to “play.” Frost commented that Dickinson’s “poetry is play” (313) when 
he read lines like “The Lightning skipped like mice” (Fr 1246) and “The Mountains – 
grow” (Fr 768). Frost’s recognition of Dickinson and the influence of her form of play 
started early: “[Frost] lived with Emily Dickinson from the beginning of his writing of 
verse”; it was in 1892—when Frost was eighteen—that he began reading Dickinson’s 
poems shortly after they first appeared (310). So from the beginning, Frost adopted a 
playful approach to poetry that allowed him space to consider the possibilities of meaning 
in nature. This play in nature, Keller writes, stems from a paradigm: that for Dickinson, 
“The Fall…did not make the world a wasteland” (307). Frost shared this view,6 which is 
especially pertinent when we consider that he wrote during the high modernist period. 
Because the world was not a wasteland to Frost, he saw the natural world a worthwhile 
place to look for meaning. To find meaning, he had to play, as Dickinson did, which 
allowed him to “dwell in possibility.” 
George Bagby adds two more terms to describe Keller’s “play” in his book Frost 
and the Book of Nature: “imaginative adventurousness” and “extravagance” (24). In his 
chapter “Eyes Seeking the Response of Eyes,” Bagby comments on Frost’s efforts to 
“read” nature writing that the seeker of knowledge “needs to relinquish willful control of 
his [revelatory] progress—however unsettling the prospect may be—and become lost…” 
(29). Calling Frost’s play “imaginative adventurousness” and “extravagance” is fairly 
accurate as Frost used the word “extravagance” himself when referring to this type of 
play. Frost gave a talk titled “On Extravagance” at Dartmouth College in the 
6. Jay Parini, Frost’s most recent biographer, suggests that Frost’s fourth book of 
poetry, New Hampshire, was perhaps a “satirical response to Eliot’s The Waste 
Land” (209). Frost would certainly have shared Dickinson’s view that “The Fall…
did not make the world a wasteland.”
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fall of 1962 in which he highlights many of Bagby’s main points (Frost 902). In this 
address Frost speaks of the extravagance of poetry, which seems closely related to his 
interest in Dickinson’s play. He labels extravagance “ a kind of an exaggeration,” like 
an exaggerated claim (903). In poetry, this extravagance is a chance for the poet to go 
beyond the expected, magnifying a moment (a sort of hyperbolic move) to emphasize 
an idea, a feeling, or an experience. Frost also said in his talk that “extravagance lies 
in ‘it sometimes seems as if’” (904). Extravagance is both in the language used in the 
poem and the imaginative approach to the content. Frost says that some people cannot 
“go with” this extravagance, living or remaining safe in settled realities or what is 
widely accepted (904). Extravagance, then, is pushing one’s self beyond the boundary 
of the familiar, the accepted, and the shared. As we will see later, the lack of extravagant 
action, or imaginative adventurousness—an open-minded inquiry—results in a failed 
attempt at revelation. Just as Dickinson’s “poems make a space in which she can dance,” 
Frost’s poems quite similarly make a space in which he can explore (Keller 306-07). 
This imaginative adventurousness is a chance for Frost to be not only in nature but part 
of nature. It is a place where he can make “something else” from his play. This play 
in meaning making is important enough to Frost, Bagby claims, that “the prospect of 
physical death is less appalling to Frost than that of the imaginative death that results 
from excessive clinging to the familiar” (27). Extravagance is play in the unfamiliar, a 
willingness to let go of and set aside beliefs in search for something new—sometimes 
sacrificing the rational for the chance to explore.
Aiming for imaginative adventurousness through extravagance and play leads 
directly to becoming lost in nature, taking Dickinson’s “dwelling in possibility” a 
step further. Bagby writes, “If the seeker is to achieve the deepest kind of educational 
encounter with the natural world, he needs at least on occasion to pursue extra-vagance 
until he achieves yet a further stage of visionary readiness…,[to] become lost in order to 
find himself more truly and more strange” (29). To become lost Bagby writes you must 
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cooperate “with natural forces in order to be ‘overwhelmed’ by and ultimately lost in 
them.” Frost “dwells in Possibility” as Dickinson does, but dwells long enough to become 
lost. Jay Parini—one of Frost’s more recent biographers—refers to Frost’s attempt to 
receive revelation, writing, “One must plunge into loss and despair before arriving at a 
condition of salvation” (362). Adding to this, Robert Hass writes that for Frost “spiritual 
renewal and wholeness can be attained only when one is willing first to confront physical 
decay and then, paradoxically, to move beyond it” (84). The idea of becoming lost, then, 
is a continuation of extravagance. “Cooperation” with nature is extravagant play. While in 
the midst of this play, the letting go of the familiar results in becoming lost, which opens 
the self to revelation. 
Frost clearly demonstrates letting go of the familiar (play) to become lost in his 
poem “Directive.” The speaker claims that he only has “at heart your getting lost,” so he 
takes the reader through extravagance and imaginative play. The path he takes the reader 
down is reflective. Hass writes that Frost’s “quest for spiritual renewal must first be 
conditioned by an accompanying loss of conventions is evident in the first ‘directive’ of 
the poem” (84):
Back out of all this now too much for us, 
Back in a time made simple by the loss 
Of detail, burned, dissolved, and broken off 
Like graveyard marble sculpture in the weather (1-4)
The speaker displays his play and effort to become lost (and even lose the reader) in 
the language and subject of the poem. The vague pronoun “this” in the first line and the 
stunning comparison of a weathered headstone begins this poem in Frost’s imaginative 
adventurousness. Frost’s extravagance continues as he fills the poem with similes and 
metaphors: the road your guide will take you on “May seem as if it should have been a 
quarry” (my emphasis 10) and the town’s rubble seems haunted; you may feel you are 
being “watched… / As if by eye pairs…” (my emphasis 21-22). When the speaker does 
describe the subject (being the ghost town in which the guide takes the reader) he often 
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negates the importance of the images shared, furthering the play that leads to becoming 
lost by saying, “You must not mind a certain coolness from” the glacier which once 
carved out the valley “Nor need you mind” being watched “As if by eye pairs out of 
forty firkins” (18, 22). Such negations sidetrack the reader to avoid coming to any certain 
meaning or clear narrative. The imaginative play peaks as the speaker says, “Make 
yourself up a cheering song of how / Someone’s road home from work this once was” 
(29-30). And interestingly, it is only after the speaker writes “And if you’re lost enough to 
find yourself / By now,” does he conclude that “Then” you can “make yourself at home” 
(36-37, 39). 
The speaker’s play and efforts to lose himself lead him to the source of 
inspiration: “Your destination and your destiny’s / A brook that was the water of the 
house, / Cold as a spring as yet so near its source” (49-51). The entire purpose or 
“destination” of the speaker’s tour is to lead the reader to a brook. The revelatory attempt 
is made clear as the speaker refers to the brook as a source of inspiration or knowledge. 
In writing about Frost’s poem “Spring Pools,” Parini points out that “Water, [in ‘Spring 
Pools’] as elsewhere in Frost, can be taken to mean a substance into which one dips for 
inspiration” (234). The brook in “Directive” plays a similar role. Hass comments that “a 
final peace will endure for those willing to abandon desire and open themselves to the 
possibility of further loss” (86). Thus Frost ends his poem, writing, “Here are your waters 
and your watering place. / Drink and be whole again beyond confusion” (62). Clearly 
“Directive” is a poem about looking to nature as a source of knowledge. As Bagby 
writes, “Directive” is “Frost’s most explicit attempt to describe preparation for vision or 
revelation” (Bagby 30).
What is most challenging in Frost’s poems about getting lost is the process of 
discerning the moment and content of revelations that is the motive for getting lost in the 
first place. Many of Frost’s poems are written with a parabolic style, which makes use of 
his “play” and becoming “lost.” I define his parabolic style as displaying one meaning 
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while concealing another. In other words, many of Frost’s poems have a surface narrative 
that leads the reader one way while a greater “spiritual” truth—often contradictory and 
subverting to the initial reading—undercuts the more obvious reading. Robert Hass 
describes this parabolic style as “discernible thematic countermovements [that] often 
neutralize ideas that at first glance appear absolute” (100). Frost explains why he writes in 
parables in the end of “Directive”: “I have kept hidden… / A broken drinking goblet… / 
Under a spell so the wrong ones can’t find it, / So can’t get saved, as Saint Mark says they 
mustn’t” (55, 57-59 ). Parini clarifies these lines, writing that “Frost refers here to Mark 
4:11-12, where Jesus says, ‘Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of 
God: but unto them that are without, all these things are done in parables. That seeing 
they may see, and not perceive; and hearing they may hear, and not understand…’” 
(362). Essentially, Parini writes, those who are “unprepared for the experience, cannot 
participate in the revelations offered here.”
Frost’s poem “For Once, Then, Something” is a good example of this style, 
showing the results of imaginative expectation. This poem is also important to look at as 
his speaker is seeking some sort of truth in nature, asking whether knowledge is found in 
or created about nature. The poem begins, “Others taunt me with having knelt at well-
curbs,” which almost sounds like a response to Dickinson’s “What Mystery Pervades a 
Well” (Fr 1433) where the speaker concludes: “those who know [nature], know her less / 
The nearer her they get” (23-24). One way we can view this poem, then, is Frost’s effort 
to get nearer the source or look towards the source of inspiration as his speaker looks 
down and into a well, trying to see past the water. The first six lines read:
Others taunt me with having knelt at well-curbs
Always wrong to the light, so never seeing
Deeper down in the well than where the water
Gives me back in a shining surface picture
Me myself in the summer heaven godlike
Looking out of a wreath of fern and cloud puffs.
We see the speaker admitting his flawed perspective, “Always wrong to the light,” so 
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he can never see beyond his own reflection, which creates a problem beyond nature 
being unknowable: what meaning the speaker finds in nature may only be a reflection of 
himself, not something intrinsic. Also, the fact that the water reflects the heavens with 
godlike images and cloud puffs speaks to the desire Frost has to receive some sort of 
revelation from nature and, in this poem specifically, water, a source of inspiration for 
writing poetry. Considering all this, it seems, at first, that Frost positions his speaker 
alongside Dickinson’s in that he sees “The Tents to Nature’s Show” but cannot see 
“Deeper down” or beyond the “surface picture.” But looking at the first line again shows 
an important distinction between Frost and Dickinson’s reading of nature. The speaker 
himself is not concerned at seeing his own reflection in the water, it is “Others [that taunt 
him] with having knelt at well-curbs / Always wrong to the light.” It is the others that 
mock him for seeking revelation, pointing out that he only gets back a visual echo of himself. 
Whether or not this poem was written in response to Dickinson is hard to say. 
Frost is certainly writing it in response to some sort of critic. Parini writes that “For 
Once, Then, Something” was partly a “response to critics who saw him as a country 
bumpkin whose poems did not see much beyond the “shining surface” of rural life, with 
himself at its center” (181-82). If it is others that are concerned with this situation, one 
might assume that Frost is content with seeing himself as part of the revelatory process. 
In this light, we can see how the speaker sees himself as “godlike.” The juxtaposition 
of the heavens and the speaker’s face reflected in the water shows the speaker searching 
for some sort of inspiration, recognizing his own part in the revelatory process. This is 
certainly a theme that repeats itself in other poems. And whether or not this is a direct 
response, Frost ultimately shows that he tolerates the idea of the individual seeing himself 
in nature as part of the source of inspiration, a matter we will discuss later. 
 The next four lines take a dramatic turn, showing the precariousness or 
uncertainty found in such jointly created revelation:
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Once, when trying with chin against a well-curb,
I discerned, as I thought, beyond the picture,
Through the picture, a something white, uncertain,
Something more of the depths—and then I lost it.
No longer is there only a reflection of himself in the water, he sees, “as [he] thought, 
beyond the picture.” Frost uses revelatory language here—having a moment of clarity 
that quickly vanishes. The speaker “thought” he discerned “beyond the picture.” The 
uncertainty of the revelatory moment compels him to quickly change his description from 
“beyond” to “through the picture.” The revelation, whether it happens too fast or is still at 
an awkward angle of light, is not clear. Is it beyond or through the picture on the surface? 
It is a “something white, [and] uncertain...,” but certainly “Something more of the depths” 
(emphasis added). Out of the fifteen lines in this poem, only these four admit that there 
was a moment of seeing beyond the veil, which touches on another theme in Frost’s 
nature poetry. If there are revelatory moments, they are only moments. Rarely if ever do 
they come as fully packaged texts of meaning. 
The next five lines show Frost’s imaginative play:
Water came to rebuke the too clear water.
One drop fell from a fern, and lo, a ripple
Shook whatever it was lay there at bottom,
Blurred it, blotted it out. What was that whiteness?
Truth? A pebble of quartz? For once, then, something. 
The disclosure of truth sought beyond the surface does not last long. Just as the grass 
plays an important role in Dickinson’s “What Mystery” by distinguishing between 
human understanding of nature and nature’s understanding of nature—“The grass does 
not appear afraid” of what the speaker of Dickinson’s poem finds so much “awe”—so 
does the fern in Frost’s “For Once.” It is almost as though nature knew the speaker 
had seen just enough, perhaps close to too much, so the “Water came to rebuke the too 
clear water” and staunched the revelatory moment. If nature can rebuke the water, then 
perhaps it also had the power to clear it for one small moment. But certainly the claim 
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that this perfectly timed moment was a purposeful act by nature is Frost’s imagination 
at work. Frost’s imaginative extravagance in personifying nature to turn on and off the 
valve of revelation suggests that Frost believes that a working process from nature and 
an interpretive process from the human mind itself in the form of play are necessary 
to receive revelation. The phrase “and lo”—and as Parini points out the biblical word 
“rebuke”—place the revelatory moment close to the spiritual realm (182). Through 
Frost’s deliberate contradiction of including both self-created revelation and a beam of 
spiritual insight from an external source in the same poem as a way to communicate with 
nature, I believe, accurately represents Frost’s belief that both are necessary. 
That Frost and Dickinson reminisce about nature’s impenetrable barrier at “well-
curbs” seems to place them in opposition with one another. Dickinson’s “mystery” that 
pervades the well seems to negate Frost’s assertion that a moment of clarity is possible. 
For Frost, however, mystery still pervades and even prevails. In many of his nature 
poems the moments of truth, the revelatory moments, come and go so quickly that the 
speaker cannot be positive the moment even really existed. Parini points out that “the last 
line [in ‘For Once…’] is deeply ironic, in that the ‘something’ might well be ‘nothing’ 
(182). The movement from “Truth” to a “pebble of quartz” equals that from the inspired 
to the prosaic. There was simply a glimmer of light or a glimpse of something. The peace 
from assurance is never given; thus mystery still prevails. 
To leave the poem here, however, would be to exclude the subversive element 
in Frost’s parabolic style that coincides with his inclusion of multiple perspectives for 
viewing nature. Because Frost sets the reader in a position to see more than the speaker, 
the reader is privileged to see not only what the speaker learns but what the speaker 
overlooks and completely misses. Too focused on what may be “Deeper down in the 
well… / beyond the picture, / Through the picture…,” the speaker overlooks the possible 
significance of the drop of water that fell from the fern. Rather than describing the image 
of the ripple—how its penetrating drop sends waves from one central point which reach 
53
and bounce off the wall to offset the rhythm still radiating from the original drop—the 
speaker focuses on what is lost and never seen: “ a ripple / Shook whatever it was lay 
there at bottom, / Blurred it, blotted it out.” The speaker is then left with what he views 
as a fleeting glimpse of truth. Limited by his imaginative expectations, the speaker does 
indeed recognize the drop as a response from nature. After all, both fern and water are 
certainly part of nature, and he personifies the water as a being with agency: “Water 
came to rebuke the too clear water.” Yet the speaker fails to register its significance in his 
search for “something.” For Frost, seeking to fulfill expectations before learning to listen 
to or view nature openly leads to failure in receiving revelation from nature. 
If revelation is possible, as Frost continually asserts, then how does one recognize 
or identify it as revelation: what does it look like, or what form does it take? Implicitly 
addressing these questions, Amelia Klein also concludes that preconceived ideas or 
expectations of the form of revelation blind humans to a reciprocal relationship with 
nature. In her essay “The Counterlove of Robert Frost,” Klein challenges the myth that 
Frost is merely a dark poet as has commonly been accepted. Certainly Frost in his desert 
places responds to nature from a modernist viewpoint, but Frost’s opinions about nature 
are also based in the romantic tradition. Klein argues that “Frost shares with his romantic 
forebears a vision of the natural world as the source and context of our lives” (362). The 
title of her essay taken from Frost’s poem “The Most of it,” emphasizes the point that 
Frost actively thought and wrote about the possibility of a reciprocal relationship between 
humans and the natural world. 
As I reviewed in the introduction, the character of this poem desires “not [his] 
own love back in copy speech, / But counter-love, original response.” But as the reader 
is privileged to see what the speaker overlooks in “For Once…,” the character in “The 
Most of It” focuses the entire poem on the character searching for response from nature. 
The critique of the character in this poem is found in the first two words of the poem: 
“He thought he kept the universe alone” (my emphasis). These two words show the 
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character’s failure to objectively view nature while seeking revelation. The speaker 
believes he is alone because “…all the voice in answer he could wake / Was but the 
mocking echo of his own / From some tree-hidden cliff across the lake.” The character 
claims that he wants “not his own love back in copy speech, / But counter-love, 
original response.” 
As we see, then, Klein’s use of Frost’s “counterlove” in her title is applicable 
to Frost’s search for original response. But what I take away from Klein’s essay is her 
recognition and analysis of Frost’s implicit critique of imaginative expectation. In her 
reading of “The Most of It,” Klein states that what Frost’s character wants is
Not echoes, not redoublings, but rather a genuine exchange, a reciprocity 
in which what one receives is not one’s own gift back again, repelled. The 
irony, of course, is that our hero wishes to dictate the form that “original 
response” should take; it should be receptive to his calls, should return 
them in his own tongue…. The condition he cries out upon…is precisely 
what he seeks to confirm, and so the form his demand takes precludes 
its satisfaction. Anything that is not an echo risks being identified as 
“nothing.” (366)
With Klein’s point of view, we see that the character tricks himself into thinking he is 
searching for revelation, but all he really is looking for is something human—a “voice,” 
or perhaps an affirmation of what he already believes. Disappointed in the lack of genuine 
revelation from nature, his belief that he keeps the universe alone is confirmed (in the first 
line of the poem). The character seeks assurance of what he already believes rather than 
to “dwell in Possibility.” He wants to know, not accept mystery as an answer. The answer 
he thinks he receives is his own image. 
In this sense we see the dangers of imagining revelation in a manner that merely 
mimics our inner desires. Frost shows us on one level a character looking for original 
response from nature only to be disappointed at receiving what he wants to see. This is 
a warning from Frost demonstrating the dangers of solipsism (Bagby 32). The second 
half of the poem, however, implicitly suggests that he missed the revelatory moment. 
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The answer came “As a great buck it powerfully appeared” (16). The buck “crashed / In 
the cliff’s talus on the other side,” swam across the lake, “Pushing the crumpeled water 
up ahead, / And landed like a pouring waterfall…” (10-11, 17-18). The revelation, Klein 
writes, “does not prove human, nor does it prove that nature contains or complies with 
human intelligence” (367). The buck simply “makes its presence felt…. Its appearance…
is what forces the underbrush, making an impact.” We see here that the form of nature’s 
response takes on an assertive presence that at first glance is nothing more than an animal 
walking through the woods as imaginative expectation blinds the one seeking revelation. 
Referring to imaginative expectation, Klein writes, “…the buck breaks into the ritual 
circle of the poem where imagination obsessively repeats its wants…. By failing to be 
the hoped-for revelation—which would, in fact, be a repetition of the already known 
a ‘someone else additional’—the buck puts us in contact with what is not additive but 
other…by no means an accretion of or adjunct to the human.” The fact that the character 
completely misses the revelatory moment, then, is evidence for the possibility of 
“original response.” 
The character overlooking the moment makes an other out of nature (the buck), 
which places the source of revelation beyond his (the human) imagination. The fact of the 
matter is that the buck did jump in the water, swim across the lake, and climb out on the 
other side. There was no imaginative construction in this scene. This objective moment 
where the speaker and character both observe a buck climbing out of the lake allows 
for a possible reciprocal relationship to occur. Because the speaker ends the poem with 
such an ambiguous line—“and that was all”—it seems as though the character dismisses 
the moment as mere whim, while the speaker considers the moment as evidence. This 
example is more explicit in “Two Look at Two,” where at the end of the poem, two hikers 
coming upon a doe and buck are stunned, realizing that “the earth in one unlooked-for 
favor / Had made them certain earth returned their love” (41-42). Frost is aware that how 
one approaches nature affects the success of pure revelation. In “Two Look at Two,” Frost 
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purposely says, “one unlooked-for favor,” suggesting that imaginative play is important 
but not imaginative expectation. Expectation is the imposing of the self or the projection 
of social constructions onto nature while play is the dwelling in possibilities with the aim 
of becoming lost. 
To this point, then, we see Frost’s seemingly contradictory implication that there 
exists both an external and universal nature. It would be easy to assume that Frost fully 
supports an external nature when as in “For Once…,” the speaker looks into a well for 
truth from nature. Also supporting the external idea, the character in “The Most…” 
calls out to nature, looking to the trees and cliff for some sort of response, which comes 
in a form he does not recognize. Both poems show the speaker or character seeking 
revelation from an external source. But Frost also leaves room for the universal nature 
interpretation. The ripple that blurs the bottom of the well must still have been reflecting 
the image of the speaker, becoming a wavy mix of sky and distorted facial features, a 
combined image reminding the speaker and reader that any human truth stems from 
a hybrid source—the interpreting self and observable nature. “The Most…” still 
leaves room to conclude that even a buck climbing out of a lake is the workings of the 
imagination itself, thus revelation as still constructed by the imagination responding to itself. 
Reading his poem “All Revelation,” however, complicates the issue further as 
Frost discusses universal nature explicitly on one level while implicitly subverting this 
assertion on another. I am not the first to notice Frost’s desire to communicate with 
nature, nor am I the first to see that Frost has an interesting view of the relationship 
between external and universal nature. Bagby acknowledges Frost’s desire for 
communication when he writes, “…Frost devotes a considerable amount of attention 
to the question of how the human observer can best improve his chances of visionary 
success” (22). Bagby labels external and universal differently, naming universal nature 
“pure subjectivism” and external nature “pure fact.” He traces Frost’s contradictory 
back-and-forth views between pure subjectivism and pure fact and concludes that “For 
57
the poet himself, the truth undoubtedly lies somewhere between these two extremes, one 
yielding to pure subjectivism, the other denying the imagination any power or freedom” 
(33). Overall, “All Revelation” shows Frost’s indecisiveness on the subject. He is not able 
to place the process of revelation wholly on an external or universal foundation. It also 
shows his ultimate suggestion that meaning making is a joint process that is central to his 
metaphorical, consummate relationship with nature. To begin this more in-depth look, it 
will help to read the entire poem at once rather than in chunks:
 
A head thrusts in as for the view,
  But where it is it thrusts in from
Or what it is it thrusts into 
By that Cyb’laean avenue,
And what can of its coming come,
And whither it will be withdrawn,
And what take hence or leave behind,
These things the mind has pondered on
A moment and still asking gone. 
Strange apparition of the mind!
But the impervious geode
Was entered, and its inner crust
Of crystals with a ray cathode
At every point and facet glowed
In answer to the mental thrust.
 
Eyes seeking the response of eyes
Bring out the stars, bring out the flowers,
Thus concentrating earth and skies
So none need be afraid of size.
All revelation has been ours.
Two readings simultaneously stand out for interpretation, showing Frost’s inability to 
decide on either external or universal nature. First, at the more explicit level, Frost’s 
speaker claims, as Bagby writes, “that all the vision we have has been and must be 
forged by our own imaginative efforts” (22). As Dickinson writes “The Outer – from the 
Inner / Derives it’s magnitude,” so Frost concludes, “All revelation has been ours.” An 
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initial reading of this poem takes a more negative view of the universal aspect, assuming 
there is nothing new learned about nature; it is all culturally constructed. The adjective 
“All” shuts out any possibility that there may be parts or pieces of revelation received 
from nature that are inherent or genuinely given from the material/external world. This 
exemplifies Bagby’s idea of pure subjectivism. Bagby suggests that the imagination is 
able to “shape a natural scene,” that it has “active control” and manipulates “…what it 
perceives;” thus any idea or premonition we think we receive is made up (32, 33). Indeed 
it is hard to disagree with this reading as Frost writes that it is only after the geode was 
entered that “every point and facet glowed.” And certainly the power implied in “Eyes 
seeking the response of eyes…[concentrate] earth and skies” suggests that Frost believes 
in a wholly universal approach to nature—that truly there is no nature that exists outside 
human interpretation; therefore, a pure revelation does not or cannot exist. The mental 
thrust spoken of is an assertive move by the human, a compelling argument that this 
poem’s central argument is that all revelation is “pure subjectivism.” 
But even in this, one of his most overt poems supporting pure subjectivism, Frost 
undercuts the more explicit reading by leaving space for a more implicit interpretation 
that still holds to the external nature idea, again emphasizing what we have already seen 
in “The Most of It.” The poem takes a turn on the word “But” at the beginning of the 
third stanza. This word marks the return to the original narrative of the poem. The first 
line sets up the narrative of a head thrusting “in as for the view” but quickly the speaker 
digresses into a meditative moment for the next nine lines. The turning point basically 
says that despite this meditative moment, the geode was entered. This narrative (line 
one and stanzas three and four) obscures and reveals the failing point of revelation. One 
reading may show that “Eyes seeking the response of eyes” proves that all revelation is 
socially constructed, but this same line also shows why the speaker concludes that “All 
revelation is ours.” The speaker of “The Most” ironically sought for human voice in 
nature, thus mistaking his echo as proof that revelation is of his own making. Likewise, 
59
in “All Revelation,” eyes seeking eyes find the revelation to be constructed. Again we 
see that it is when human seeks the human in nature (a form of imaginative expectation) 
that the conclusion is made that revelation must only be the result of the mind. This 
does not mean that Frost sees no relation between him and nature (because ultimately 
my conclusion is that there needs to be both imaginative effort and outside/external 
revelation), but I think it shows that to handle the possibility of revelation with an 
extremist perspective leaves one missing the point.   
“All Revelation” does more than merely critique the universal perspective, 
however; it demonstrates how original response reveals itself (which is the fact that 
the cathode shines, there’s no wish here). Klein points out, “the possibility of original 
response…is staked on nature’s power to break through the established text and assert 
the reality of the not-yet-written” (368). Just as the Buck provides the action of nature in 
“The Most,” so the cathode in line thirteen of “All Revelation” provides an unconstructed 
encounter with nature. The cathode on a light source is the point where light or electricity 
leaves the cell. Here, then, the cathode acts as a revelatory conduit of sorts to support 
both perspectives. Whether or not eyes were seeking eyes, the cathode still “glowed.” 
Depending on what one seeks, however, this glow could be perceived as a construction 
of the mind or a revelation. Approaching revelation with imaginative expectation—
“Eyes seeking the response of eyes”—would lead one to conclude that any meaning the 
cathode ray contains lies within the viewer’s mind. By first becoming lost, the individual 
approaches nature with an open mind, interpreting the assertive force from nature as a 
form of original response. Nature may assert itself but it cannot penetrate any further into 
the mind of man than man can into nature. Man has to be ready to receive; expectations 
have to be lowered. Nature can offer original response to the listener, but not into. 
I conclude that Frost believes meaning making needs to be a combination of 
pure subjectivism and pure fact because he complicates the separation of external 
from universal. He does so in two ways. First, “All Revelation,” like “For Once, Then, 
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Something” and “The Most of It,” follows a parabolic pattern; it presents a surface 
narrative and conceals a greater spiritual truth. The surface narrative of “All Revelation” 
suggests that meaning found in nature is a construction of the imagination. The concealed 
truth is the cathode’s ray: an assertive move from nature that when the individual is lost, 
he considers it to be revelation. Interestingly, the speaker in “All Revelation” hints or 
even warns giving the answer to why someone may find nature only external in “All 
Revelation.” Those who are seeking original response are “Eyes seeking the response 
of eyes.” In a sense, the speaker pointing to this is like the speaker in “Directive” who 
cautions his tour group not to “mind the serial ordeal / Of being watched from forty 
cellar holes / As if by eye pairs out of forty firkins.” This striking resemblance to “All 
Revelation’s” line “Eyes seeking the response of eyes” shows the parabolic style in 
action: in “Directive the guide has “at heart your getting lost” (9) in order to avoid 
seeking the response of eyes; in “All Revelation” the speaker is less explicit. 
The second reason that this poem complicates the separation of external from 
universal is Frost’s play in metaphor. “All Revelation” complicates the issue because we 
cannot be sure whether or not the poem is speaking of a literal, physical head entering 
into a cave or just a mental, metaphysical thrust—the poem’s play in metaphor. The 
first line, “A head thrusts in as for the view,” starts the reader on the literal level. But 
the following lines (where the head thrusts from and into, what will be left behind, and 
whether it will be withdrawn) turn the encounter into something more theoretical as the 
speaker says, “These things the mind has pondered on.” The subsequent stanza indicates 
that we are back on the literal level: “But the impervious geode / Was entered.” We 
are led to believe that whether or not these questions are answered, whether or not we 
understand this “strange apparition of the mind,” a head still entered a cave, looking for 
something. The search for revelation is answered at the end of the stanza as the light 
shining from the crystals becomes a metaphor for inspiration received “In answer to the 
mental thrust.” Still questioning whether or not the poem is working on a literal level, 
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Frost ends the poem suggesting that eyes searching for eyes determine the size of earth 
and skies: “All revelation has been ours.” 
For these two reasons—namely Frost’s parabolic style and play in metaphor—we 
see Frost complicating the issue with indeterminacy. This indeterminacy leads me to 
believe that he must, as Bagby points out, believe the relationship between humans and 
nature is somewhere between the universal and external nature concepts, somewhere 
between pure subjectivism and pure fact. It is Frost’s play in metaphor (specifically in 
this poem) that sets my final interpretation of “All Revelation”: which is the metaphorical 
consummate relationship between nature and the individual, which metaphor Frost might 
suggest is necessary for understanding the important role both the human and nature play 
in the revelatory process.
 Perhaps on a simplified level we can take the suggestion implied in this poem that 
the relationship between humans and nature is a similar or “like” relationship to mind and 
body. To look at Frost’s consummate metaphor in a more complex way, however, we need 
to ask who the speaker includes in the pronoun “ours” in the last line, which is where 
my reading of this poem departs from Bagby’s and Parini’s. Frost’s strategically placed 
“ours” as the last word in the poem. The plural pronoun could, as I have already pointed 
out, include the mind and body as separate spheres—a literal and metaphysical. This 
would imply that revelation is both a mental and physical sort of experience. Or, “ours” 
could refer to the eyes’ search for a response from eyes—the plural being a pair of eyes or 
even a collective group of eyes. To make the comparison between the metaphysical and 
physical, we could also compare the relationship between human and nature.
 Considering the sexual metaphor used in this poem, I suggest that “ours” refers 
to a relationship between human and nature. Hass calls “All Revelation” “an elaborate 
fertility ritual…”(119). The sexual imagery is blatant: “A head thrusts” in the first line; 
the reference to Cybele, a Greek goddess connected with orgasmic rites in order to 
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receive revelation; and the fact that the “impervious geode / Was entered.” The poem 
sets up a relationship between male and female. Bagby notes that “the sexual metaphor 
[makes the] mind the father of perception, [and] mater-ial nature the mother” (21). The 
speaker, then, suggests that a relationship does take place between the human and nature. 
In this poem, at least, Frost uses this sexual metaphor to explore this relationship. His 
meditative moment demonstrates this exploration, implying that to commune with and 
receive from nature there needs to be some consummate action by means of which the 
human mind enters nature’s depths:
But where it is it thrusts in from
Or what it is it thrusts into 
By that Cyb’laean avenue,
And what can of its coming come,
And wither it will be withdrawn,
And what take hence or leave behind
These things the mind has pondered on
A moment and still asking gone.
The speaker is contemplating the mysteries of conception. This meditation, not ending in 
a sure or confident answer, supports the idea that Frost sees a journey into the depths of 
nature based in a reciprocal “our.” It is ultimately Frost’s indeterminacy that leaves room 
for this type of conclusion. Parini points to this theme in Frost also. He writes that Frost 
always “wanted everything both ways at once” (410). He even quotes Frost saying that 
his life was a life “with more questions than answers” (418). Frost’s inability to decide 
and his play in metaphor that suggests this consummate relationship emphasizes both 
the need for a joint relationship with nature in receiving revelation and that ultimately 
the specific relationship to nature is unknowable. Hass writes that “‘All Revelation’ 
ultimately implies [that] knowledge is a product of both invention and discover[y], a 
process of creating the useful forms that reveal our relationship to the material world” 
(121).  To question, for Frost, is okay.
 Remaining consistent with his approach to nature, Frost’s “All Revelation” shows 
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the speaker in either mental or physical state entering nature. The extravagant play 
comes through his use of metaphor, and the theme of being lost is shown in two ways: 
the speaker’s meta-questions and Frost’s play through metaphor that confuses and in a 
sense loses the reader in a parabolic situation. Interestingly, Frost ends his poem with 
a sense of assurance despite these suggestions of being lost. Because all revelation has 
been ours we can, as Frost’s speaker says, concentrate “earth and skies / So none need be 
afraid of size.” This concentration helps avoid the fear and anxiety of being unsure when 
reading this poem as a parable; the implicit idea suggested is that such knowledge created 
with nature is at the same time comforting on one level yet insufficient on another. The 
speaker of the poem can have his “momentary stay against confusion,” but the idea that 
such revelation is jointly created leaves one wondering if the revelation is worth believing 
or following (Parini xi). Can it work as knowledge? Ultimately, then, Frost’s suggestion 
that revelation requires a relationship between nature and the individual means that one 
can discover the sanctuary needed for a moment and still deal with life realistically. 
Frost’s human/nature relationship suggests that knowledge created under such conditions 
is worth something yet also needs to be questioned.
Again, Frost demonstrates his fear that all meaning is ultimately his in his poem 
“A Missive Missile”: “The meaning of it is unknown, / Or else I fear entirely mine, / All 
modern, nothing ancient in’t, / Unsatisfying to us each” (43-46). Because Frost repeats 
this theme so often, it shows how Frost used his poetry to work out his personal struggles, 
his dualistic angst. Hass makes a similar conclusion, suggesting that Frost’s approach to 
nature fulfills a deeper psychological need: “…while we cannot fully recover certainty 
through either philosophy or science, we must nevertheless ‘reveal’ the forms of existence 
to ourselves in a manner that responds to our deepest psychic needs” (my emphasis 121). 
As we have seen, Frost reveals these forms of existence for himself. Klein adds to Frost’s 
personal approach to nature writing that the “power [of revelation] abides only in the 
relation” (362). Seeing revelation as jointly produced by nature and man is necessary 
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for Frost to bridge his conflicted psyche. Thus, Frost looks to nature in order to find the 
processes by which he can merge spirit with matter, which is ultimately caused by his 
conflict with Darwinian science. Parini emphasizes Frost’s need to find revelation by use 
of his imagination: “No matter what is ‘really’ happening around him, Frost is determined 
to see that it conforms to his own imagination, becomes an extension of his ongoing 
self-mythification (to an extent reversing the Darwinian idea that the environment shapes 
the individual)” (211). Hass relates this tendency to Frost’s “desire to defend free will, 
[which] stems partly from his profound need to rescue himself from the processes of 
mechanistic determinism” (101). Because of such determinism, “In a post-Darwinian 
universe devoid of any transcendent source of value, humans alone are the sole authors of 
truth, beauty, and goodness…” (53). “The act of writing is thus for Frost not only the first 
step toward coming to terms with a hostile cosmos [(his dualistic angst)] but also the first 
step toward erecting the saving structures of community, marriage, and religious faith” 
(101). Imagination for Frost, Klein concludes, “does not generate the world out of itself 
but responds to nature that…engages us creatively” (362), thus the imaginative play Frost 
“may grant us knowledge, otherwise inaccessible, of the human mind as at home in the 
nature it perceives and half –creates” (382). 
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CONCLUSION
Because Frost’s approach to nature accepts the possibility of knowing nature 
to some degree, it is easy to assume that Dickinson and Frost approach nature on 
fundamentally different levels. That these two poets work from different assumptions, 
however, is what I find intriguing and enlightening. The opposing perceptions that I 
see these poets writing from is that which I stated in the beginning of my Frost chapter: 
where Dickinson claims that we cannot know nature, Frost asserts that nature is the 
only thing worth knowing. Although each poet’s approach to nature seems to work so 
well, left without a comparison to one another, each seems extreme. Dickinson’s claim 
that nature is unknowable allows her to empower women with agency, yet it could be 
argued that her approach risks losing meaning by placing too much emphasis on socially 
created nature. And while Frost’s assertion allows him to find the spiritual meaning he so 
desperately seeks, his approach risks losing credibility by placing too much emphasis on 
the imagination’s constructive power. Understanding each poet’s approach separate from 
each other is important, but seeing how each fills the gaps that the other creates in his and 
her approach to nature says a lot about collaborative study.  
My reading of Dickinson shows her critique of how her nineteenth-century 
contemporaries used nature to impose social codes on women. As such, her use of nature 
lends itself to a social constructivist lens. But relying too heavily on social constructivism 
risks deconstructing the meaning out of everything. As I see it, the risk in approaching 
humanity’s relationship to nature as entirely socially constructed is twofold: one loses the 
value that can come from such knowledge and risks setting up a hegemonic relationship 
to nature—and by extension society—which ultimately transforms nature into material 
for consumption. Smith’s argument that a dual “concept of nature is a social product” 
explains why Dickinson’s critique of external nature works (27). Smith contends that 
when nature is seen as external, it becomes objectified and used as an object; it becomes 
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part of the human production process of meaning making. But because there also exists 
a nature that requires humans to include themselves as a part of nature, the universal 
idea was born. The simultaneous desire to produce meaning about objectified nature and 
see the human self as part of nature leads to hegemony and subjugation of nature, which 
leads to social discrepancies. Smith’s critique of nature reasonably justifies Dickinson’s 
social constructivist stance. But, left alone, such a view and approach to nature is 
“essentially materialistic,” Klein writes (364). She maintains that this materialistic 
“view of nature propels us directly into the arms of radical idealism, for once nature has 
been defined as unmeaning formlessness, form can only be impressed by the extrinsic 
ministrations of the mind or spirit.” Such idealism leaves nature as a “valueless, brute 
fact” (365). It is this observation that leads Klein into her discussion of “The Most of It” 
on how Frost’s character finds meaning in nature by a reciprocal relationship, challenging 
such idealism. Interestingly, the poem that directly follows “All Revelation” in Frost’s 
Collected Poems, Prose, and Plays is titled, “Happiness Makes Up in Height for What 
It Lacks in Length.” Such placement suggests that Frost truly believes that “In a post-
Darwinian universe devoid of any transcendent source of value, humans alone are the 
sole authors of truth, beauty, and goodness…” (53). Frost’s approach to nature, then, can 
replace where social constructivism falls short. Frost’s knowledge made from intercourse 
with nature does contain value, stays against confusion, and short-lived happiness despite 
its socially constructed qualities.
The second risk of viewing nature as socially constructed brings back the theme 
of “The Most” as interpreted by Klein: if nature is only a reflection of one’s mind, it 
reinforces rather than challenges the speaker’s belief, which introduces hegemonic 
tendencies. What the character in “The Most” desires, Klein writes, was “not communion 
[with nature] but hegemony: he wants the dominion of his intelligence to extend to every 
corner of the earth, to illuminate all obscurities” (366). The character’s expectations 
prevented him from discovering anything in nature leading him to conclude that “he kept 
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the universe alone”: the only voice in answer was the echo of his own. What he sought 
was an encounter to validate and confirm what he already believed, not an encounter 
to which he may become lost and discover. Using Smith’s words against his ideal of 
social constructivism, he warns that a socially constructed nature is used to dominate: 
“the effect is…one of conquest—or more accurately control—and the target is…social 
behavior” (27), which is where Dickinson’s critique of her contemporaries’ use of nature 
comes into play. But Frost implies that finding a form of original response—by play and 
becoming lost—prevents hegemonic domination. Klein writes that “The rough glory 
of this incomprehensible ‘embodiment’[the buck in “The Most”]—the ‘all’ of nature’s 
body, of which nothing can be definitely predicated—rebuffs the speaker’s, and the text’s 
claims to hegemony” (367). Ultimately, the speaker of “The Most” implies that there was 
original response; the character simply missed it as he was too concerned with nature as 
separate from himself, too fearful of the type of projections he may impose on nature. As 
Frost’s approach has been established, we can see that his “wandering among ideas” frees 
the individual from a wholly social constructivist lens, allowing him the ability to find 
value in the world around him. 
My reading of Frost’s approach to nature shows his conflict in working out his 
personal struggle to separate himself from mechanical determinism. But the means by 
which he so regularly responds to this fear—his imaginative approach—threatens the 
credibility or integrity of knowledge created. But when paired with Dickinson’s point 
that nature can never be considered entirely external from human experience pulls—for 
the reader of both poets—Frost’s romantic leanings back towards reality. Klein points 
out that “Truth, for Frost, requires the recognition of limitation, of the contingency of 
knowledge—knowledge precarious but not invalid,” and Dickinson would certainly 
agree that if there is knowledge created, it would be precarious (383). Dickinson’s point 
of view helps us discern in Frost’s writing what Bagby concludes: “Such an emphasis 
on imaginative self-reliance obviously adds to the responsibility which the mind must 
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bear for the success or failure of the visionary enterprise” (22). Such perspective gained 
from Dickinson helps us conclude that meaning learned from nature has power for the 
individual but becomes precarious when applied beyond the individual; if applied to a 
social setting, this meaning becomes questionable (or possibly dangerous).
  How I see each poet’s opposite approach as reconciled is that both Dickinson 
and Frost seem more interested in the process of meaning making than the end product. 
Dickinson is concerned with who is in control of the process; let the conclusion be 
what it may. For Frost, as  Hass points out, “What counts…is not so much the integrity 
of our concepts as the processes by which we derive whatever meaning we can from a 
mysterious and “impervious” natural world” (120). Hass continues, writing, that just 
as “‘All Revelation’ ultimately implies, knowledge is a product of both invention and 
discovery, a process of creating the useful forms that reveal our relationship to the 
material world” (Hass 121). Thus nature as external does not always place it in a position 
to be dominated or objectified. Nature is not always seen as separate from the human for 
the purpose of domination. Smith writes that this process of objectification has become 
natural, which is where Frost might agree with him. The problem is not objectifying 
nature by use of the imagination; the problem is believing that the objectification process 
is natural. Frost maintains that one should not become complacent in losing or over 
using the imagination, especially to the point of viewing this process as “natural.” To 
view the process as natural blinds the individual from seeing the value that can come 
in creating knowledge based in nature and can also blind the individual from seeing the 
need to question such joint-created knowledge. Unintentional or unrecognized use of 
the imagination or even the loss of the imagination—in a word: complacency—results 
in a blind naturalization of the objectification process, which binds the one creating 
knowledge to one perspective. Thus, the play in imagination must be purposeful as well 
as conscious. Unconscious play results in blind thinking and hegemonic structure. Hass 
writes that Frost’s “insistence upon a freely chosen will could enable one to “wander 
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among ideas…”(46). And it is this wandering that Frost shares with Dickinson when she 
seeks for more play herself—more defining power—from dominant definitions of women 
in the nineteenth century.
Interestingly, then, Frost’s common image as a public poet and Dickinson’s 
famous portrayal as an agoraphobic collides with my reading to show the opposite: Frost 
as a poet writing about his personal struggle with meaning and Dickinson as a poet who 
is much more concerned with social and public life than the initial reading of her poetry 
suggests. By switching these two poet’s public images, we see that they relate in many 
more ways than one. We see that a liberal mind in such a conservative setting can give 
to a more conservative mind in a liberal setting: Dickinson’s feminist point of view in 
nineteenth-century New England to Frost’s romantic tendencies in the high modernist period.
Each poet’s differences enhance our appreciation for the other’s approach to 
nature. Where it could be argued that Dickinson errs on the side of social constructivism, 
Frost makes up for it as he suggests that there is a form of original response we can 
rely on as we “wander among ideas.” Where it could be argued that Frost errors on 
imaginative construction, Dickinson makes up for it when she challenges the validity of 
placing nature in an external position with revelatory power.
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